

I S L  
A M  
P H O  
B I A

The intensification of racism  
against Muslim communities  
in the UK

Published November 2024.

The Runnymede Trust is the UK's leading independent racial justice think tank.

Proudly independent, we speak truth to power on race and racism without fear or favour. From broadening the curriculum to exposing the Windrush scandal, our work is rooted in challenging structural racism and its impact on communities of colour. Our authoritative research-based interventions equip policy makers, practitioners and the general public with the tools to deliver genuine progress towards racial justice in Britain.

Art and design by artist Sabba Khan.

Open access. Some rights reserved. The Runnymede Trust wants to encourage the circulation of its work as widely as possible while retaining the copyright. The trust has an open access policy which enables anyone to access its content online without charge. Anyone can download, save, perform or distribute this work in any format, including translation, without written permission. This is subject to the terms of the Creative Commons Licence Deed: Attribution-Non-Commercial-No Derivative Works 2.0 UK: England & Wales.

Its main conditions are:

- You are free to copy, distribute, display and perform the work;
- You must give the original author credit;
- You may not use this work for commercial purposes;
- You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work.

You are welcome to ask the Runnymede Trust for permission to use this work for purposes other than those covered by the licence. Runnymede is grateful to Creative Commons for its work and its approach to copyright. For more information please go to [www.creativecommons.org](http://www.creativecommons.org)



# ISLAMOPHOBIA

**The intensification of racism  
against Muslim communities  
in the UK**



# CONTENTS



<b>3</b>	-----	Contents
<b>5</b>	-----	Foreword
<b>8</b>	-----	Acknowledgements
<b>10</b>	-----	Introduction
<b>18</b>	-----	Islamophobia and the 2024 UK general election
<b>26</b>	-----	Reflections on state regulation of Muslim public behaviour
<b>34</b>	-----	Islamophobia in higher education: Norms of inequality in Muslim student's university experiences
<b>44</b>	-----	The Muslim prison population
<b>52</b>	-----	Prevent
<b>60</b>	-----	Policing solidarities and Islamophobia
<b>68</b>	-----	Growing Islamophobia and Muslim mental health: Current challenges and future movements
<b>78</b>	-----	Bibliography

**EVEN THOUGH  
MUSLIMS ARE  
NOT ONE RACE,  
THEY ARE STILL  
RACIALISED**




# FOREWORD

**Nesrine Malik**

**A persistent way in which claims of Islamophobia are discredited is through semantic diversion. Lived realities become subject to abstract arguments regarding the fact that Muslims cannot be subject to group discrimination because they 'are not a race', and that criticising Islam, or religious practices, is fair and not rooted in any prejudice. What that argument fails to grasp is that even though Muslims are not one race, they are still racialised – in that their treatment is based on assumptions about their beliefs, behaviour and politics.**

In the UK, Muslims also overwhelmingly tend to be of an ethnic minority background, and so their racialisation as Muslims overlaps with their collective experience as people of colour living under institutional racism. They also live in the long shadow of the War on Terror and the securitising of Muslims under anti-terror schemes that have surveilled and scrutinised them, rendering them suspect until proven otherwise simply because of their identities. Undergirding much of the blasé attitude towards Islamophobia in this country is the logic which has been projected by government and internalised by the public – that terrorist incidents have made it incumbent upon authorities to scrutinise Muslim populations in the service of broader security.



Muslims therefore have become an expression of two anxieties, one **racial**, one **religious**.

Muslims represent the growth of the minority immigrant population in the UK, and the expansion of religious and community values that challenge the status quo. The result is persistent othering of Muslims in politics and the media. Little has expressed this more than the alarm at how Muslims voted in the last general election. Their motivations have been cast as 'sectarian', detrimental to integration and proof that the growth in their numbers will result in their beginning to infiltrate the mainstream and thus affect the shape of politics and the nature of the country. Little attention has been paid to their arguments about Gaza – arguments that many non-Muslims share, both in the UK and abroad. And there has been no interest in the economic profile of British Muslims and how their material frustrations intersect with those over foreign policy, giving rise to protest votes that are profoundly democratic and integrated, rather than separatist.

The general election was a microcosm of how Muslims in general are spoken of as if they are not in the room, not part of the country, and not seriously impacted by how they are constantly othered and their behaviour pathologised. The result is right-wing rhetoric about Muslims that goes unchallenged, and political messaging that affects not only policy but media coverage and public attitudes. The combined effect is an environment that impacts Muslims' mental wellbeing, polices and limits their self-expression, and constrains their civic rights. This report is a vital and much-needed examination of that climate and how it is impacting Muslims in the country today. The less time is spent discussing the meaning and validity of Islamophobia and the more is dedicated to such highlighting of lived reality, the sooner Muslims will be free to participate in public life and thrive in their private lives.

MUSLIMS IN  
GENERAL ARE  
SPOKEN OF AS IF  
THEY ARE **NOT IN**  
**THE ROOM**, NOT PART  
OF THE COUNTRY,  
AND NOT SERIOUSLY  
IMPACTED BY  
HOW THEY ARE  
CONSTANTLY  
**OTHERED**


Nesrine Malik

# ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work relied on the generosity and support of so many people and organisations. We would like to thank the authors, Nasar Meer, Khadijah Elshayyal, Maisha Islam, Raheel Mohammed, Layla Aitlhadj, Shereen Fernandez, Waqas Tufail and Tarek Younis, for their contributions to this collection. With thanks to Nesrine Malik for her thoughtful foreword. We would like to thank Luke Finley for the copy editing of this report, and Sabba Khan for the report's design. With special thanks also to the Aziz Foundation and Islamic Relief UK for part funding this work. Finally, we would like to thank the Runnymede Trust team and trustees who worked on this report: Shabna Begum, Matthew Johnson, Hassaan Anwari, Rohini Kahrs, Linsey Harvey, Dame Donna Kinnair, Farah Elahi, Alba Kapoor, Bilal Hussain, Lesley Nelson-Addy, Maka Julios-Costa, Millie Montiel McCann, Nannette Youssef, Sophia Purdy-Moore, Stephen Walcott and Vera Petrescu.



This report is commissioned and published by the Runnymede Trust to highlight the numerous different ways that deep-seated forms of Islamophobia have intensified over this last period, which, taken together, show the structural, violent nature of Islamophobia as it manifests itself in 2024 Britain. The chapters collected here do not represent the views of Runnymede Trust as an organisation, but they offer a taste of work being done in academic and civil society spaces. By commissioning and publishing research from academics and professionals with extensive experience in Muslim communities, we shine a light upon racism against the Muslim community so that together, difficult as these conversations are, we can understand and combat it, in furtherance of our charitable objectives of racial harmony.





# INTRODUCTION

**Runnymede Trust**

**For over a year now, we have witnessed daily relentless horror and devastation in Palestine – unchecked by an impotent and seemingly indifferent international community.**

This series of chapters takes these international events as the brutal backdrop, but is firmly centred on the intensification of existing forms of Islamophobia right here in the UK.

In the year to February 2024, there was a recorded 335 per cent increase in hate cases against Muslims compared with the previous year, most of them against women. <sup>[1]</sup>



---

[1] Tell MAMA (2024) 'Greatest Rise in Reported Anti-Muslim Hate Cases to Tell MAMA since Oct 7th', 21 February

The racist riots of summer 2024, with direct attacks on Muslims, mosques and a Muslim cemetery, are one reflection of this intensification. This explosion of violence is not unrelated to the ways that UK Muslim communities have been depicted in relation to Gaza. Whether it is demonising peaceful protests as ‘hate marches’<sup>[2]</sup> or labelling people marching in solidarity with Palestinian rights as ‘Islamist extremists’<sup>[3]</sup>, these narratives have cast British Muslims as ‘outsiders’ with foreign loyalties, and as a menace to society. These same sentiments were articulated around the so-called ‘Muslim vote’ in the July 2024 general election, where Muslims who used their vote in precisely the way that a healthy democratic process obliges were then vilified for behaving in purportedly sectarian and ‘undemocratic’ ways.



Islamophobia in the UK has deep roots that can be traced back to long histories of ‘crusades’, empire and colonialism. More contemporarily, the framing of Muslims in the post-9/11 period has absorbed a number of pernicious and persistent tropes. Muslims have been depicted not only as a security threat, as seen through the extension of counter-terrorism powers that disproportionately target Muslim adults and children, but also as a cultural threat, with a supposed need to impose a regime of ‘British values’ through our school systems. And now, with activities related to protest and voting, Muslims are also framed as a democratic threat.

[2] Sabbagh, D., Stacey, K. and Syal, R. (2023) ‘Suella Braverman calls pro-Palestine demos ‘hate marches’, Guardian, 30 October, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/oct/30/uk-ministers-cobra-meeting-terrorism-threat-israel-amas-conflict-suella-braverman>

[3] Leeson, L. (2024), ‘Islamist extremists must be stopped from intimidating UK MPs, says Jenrick’, Independent, 22 February, <https://www.independent.co.uk/tv/news/lindsay-hoyle-robert-jenrick-islamic-extremists-b2500703.html>

ISLAMOPHOBIA  
IS  
ANTI-MUSLIM  
RACISM.

[It] must be  
interrogated  
beyond its  
most visible  
and violent  
expressions.

Despite these different evidential forms of Islamophobia, one of the critical impediments to the discussion is the failure to progress an agreed formal definition of the term. The Runnymede Trust was credited with popularising the term in 1997. [4] However, in the ensuing decades there has been a failure by successive governments to agree on a definition, despite numerous attempts. In 2017, we offered a simple definition – that Islamophobia is anti-Muslim racism. [5] In 2018, the All Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on British Muslims undertook an extensive review consulting academics, civil society organisations and faith groups and suggested the following simplified definition:

**Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets**

*expressions of Muslimness* **or**


*perceived Muslimness* [6]

It must be a priority for the new Labour government that a definition is agreed and used to register, deter and sanction both the kind of vitriolic voices that spout hatred towards Muslim communities from the benches of parliament and the fists and fury that were aimed at Muslims in this summer's racist riots. It must also be a priority for the government to then set about the work of getting its own house in order while setting the standard for others.

But Islamophobia must be interrogated beyond its most visible and violent expressions. Muslims make up 6.5 per cent of the UK population, which is just less than 4 million people. Data from the 2021 Census shows that Muslim communities are more dispersed across the country than ever. However, where their populations are most concentrated, they are more likely to reside in the most-deprived fifth of local authority districts, with almost half a million more Muslims now living in these most-deprived locales than in 2011. [7] The cost-of-living crisis is posing considerable hardship, with one report indicating that 54 per cent of Muslims noted some level of difficulty when paying at least one of their household bills since August 2021. [8] It is also important to register the pluralistic and diverse make-up of the Muslim community and the fact that,

as with all impacts of structural inequalities and racism, some groups face multiple and compounding factors that exacerbate and deepen their hardship. Census data from August 2021 indicates that 66 per cent of the British Black African Muslim community in the UK have experienced difficulty in paying their household bills – notably higher than any other ethnic minority community. Similarly, one in five British Black African Muslims struggled to pay at least one of their bills every month, compared with 13 per cent of all of those surveyed. [9]

This report highlights the numerous different ways that deep-seated forms of Islamophobia have intensified over this last period which, taken together, show the structural, violent nature of Islamophobia as it manifests in 2024 Britain. The chapters collected here do not represent the views of Runnymede Trust as an organisation, but they offer a taste of work being done in academic and civil society spaces.



The terms used by authors about the ongoing violence in Gaza reflect their own understanding and experience related to both their academic and their organisational work. It is important that we allow experts in the area the opportunity to share their insights and to give us an opportunity to pause and reflect on our state of play.

**For civil society organisations and those working in the racial justice sector, this report identifies how everything from education to mental health to the operations of the prison system needs to be understood as being underwritten by Islamophobic logics. It is an opportunity to understand both the breadth and the scale of Islamophobia in the UK, and by equal measure the generous and cross-cutting scope for building anti-racist solidarities.**

[4] Runnymede Trust (1997) *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, London, [www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-a-challenge-for-us-all](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-a-challenge-for-us-all).

[5] Elahi, F. and Khan O. (2017) *Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us All*, London: Runnymede Trust, [www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-still-a-challenge-for-us-all](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-still-a-challenge-for-us-all).

[6] APPG on British Muslims (2018) *Islamophobia Defined: The Inquiry into a Working Definition of Islamophobia*, London, <https://appgbritishmuslims.org/publications>.

[7] Muslim Council of Britain (2022) '2021 Census: As UK population grows, so do British Muslim communities', 29 November, <https://mcb.org.uk/2021-census-as-uk-population-grows-so-do-british-muslim-communities>.

[8] Muslim Census Team (2022) 'Muslims and the cost of living crisis', 10 November, <https://muslimcensus.co.uk/cost-of-living-crisis>.

[9] Muslim Census Team (2022) 'Muslims and the cost of living crisis', 10 November, <https://muslimcensus.co.uk/cost-of-living-crisis>.

One in **3** Muslim students experience Islamophobic abuse

Muslims in prison now make up **18** % of the population compared with 6% of the general population

Muslims tend to reside in the most deprived **5** th of local authority districts

**54** % of Muslims noted some level of difficulty paying at least one of their household bills

Muslims make up **6.5** % of the population, which is less than 4 million people.

Compared with 2023 averages there was a **365** % increase in reports to the Islamophobia Response Unit in October 2023

In the NHS Muslims are referred to Prevent **8** times more often than non-Muslims

Latest figures show **15,594** of Muslims in prison

# ISLAMOPHOBIA & THE 2024 UK GENERAL ELECTION



## Nasar Meer

Nasar Meer is professor of social and political sciences at the University of Glasgow, honorary professor at the University of Edinburgh, and a fellow of the British Academy (FBA).

## 'Plausible deniability'

is described by the Cambridge English dictionary as the ability

**'to say in a way that seems possibly true that you did not know about something or were not responsible for something'.<sup>[10]</sup>**

It is a fitting description of the long-documented racist portrayals of Muslims in the British media. <sup>[11]</sup> In light of the racist rioting that targeted people seeking asylum and Britain's Black and ethnic minorities this August (2024), <sup>[12]</sup> those responsible for incubating the sentiments that spilled onto our streets moved quickly to deny any journalistic role. An editor of the Sun in a recent interview question about the newspaper's contribution stated: 'I don't think it's fair to say what we're seeing play out on the streets now is the result of the mainstream media's coverage. I think you need to look to social media and disgusting characters like Tommy Robinson.'<sup>[13]</sup>

This is, of course, from the publication that asked its readers: 'What will we do about the Muslim problem?' <sup>[14]</sup>

<sup>[10]</sup> See <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/plausible-deniability>

<sup>[11]</sup> Meer, N. (2006) "'GET OFF YOUR KNEES": Print media public intellectuals and Muslims in Britain', *Journalism Studies*, 7(1), 35-59.

<sup>[12]</sup> Olusoga, D. (2024) 'There can be no excuses', *The Guardian*, <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/aug/10/there-can-be-no-excuses-the-uk-riots-were-violent-racism-fomented-by-populism>. 10 August, 2024.


<sup>[13]</sup> BBC Sounds (2024) *The Media Show*. Available on-line: <https://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/m0021qq5> 7 August, 2024.

<sup>[14]</sup> Kavanagh, T. (2017) 'Now Philip Hammond is finally Out he must shut the door behind him and take control over our laws, our trade and especially immigration', *The Sun*, 21 August, 2017. <https://wwwthesun.co.uk/news/4235655/now-philip-hammond-is-finally-out-he-must-shut-the-door-behind-him-and-take-control-over-our-laws-our-trade-and-especially-immigration/> Viewed 28 August, 2024.

There is a prevailing Islamophobic tendency to **exceptionalise** Muslims, to frame them as **disloyal** or associated with terrorism, and a **refusal** to recognise the broader **racism** in society

As we have previously documented in primary research with news journalists, leaders, writers and broadcasters across the political spectrum, alongside systematic case studies on the reporting of political events, there is a prevailing Islamophobic tendency to exceptionalise Muslims, to frame them as disloyal or associated with terrorism, and a refusal to recognise the broader racism in society that this mainstream media treatment reproduces. <sup>[15]</sup>

<sup>[15]</sup> Meer, N. and Modood, T. (2009) 'Refutations of racism in the 'Muslim question'', *Patterns of Prejudice*, 43 (3-4), 335-354; Meer, N., Dwyer, C. and Modood, T. (2010) 'Beyond "Angry Muslims"?' *Reporting Muslim Voices in the British Press*, *Journal of Media and Religion*, 9 (4), 216-231.



It is nonetheless still shocking to observe that in the months between the events of 7 October 2023 in Israel-Palestine, the ongoing concern over plausible genocide in Gaza and the UK general election on 4 July 2024, physical attacks on and verbal abuse of Muslims have increased by percentages in the hundreds. Islamophobia Response Unit (IRU) monthly data, for example, records that compared with the May–September 2023 average, there was a 365 per cent increase in reports to the unit in October 2023. In its last update for 2024, the IRU was recording a 301 per cent average increase in the reports it had received. [16] It is in this context that we should understand the discussion of the ‘Muslim vote’ at the last UK general election. The 2024 election has been characterised as ‘a landmark for representation’, following the increased number of Black and ethnic minority candidates elected to the UK parliament (rising to 90 today from 70 in 2019). [17] While the vast majority of these (66) are to be found in the Labour Party, with those in the Conservative Party (15) and Liberal Democrats (5) fewer in number, it is perhaps the four new independent MPs representing constituencies with a notable Muslim presence that have been making the most headlines. More precisely, one of

the themes emerging from the 2024 general election is to be found in talk of the ‘Muslim vote’ that is said to have been mobilised against the Labour Party, [18] in protest at its position on Gaza, in constituencies with a sizeable Muslim electorate.

The success of independent candidates such as Shockat Adam, a local resident in Leicester South who overturned the 22,000 majority of the incumbent shadow cabinet member Jonathan Ashworth, certainly came as a surprise. While prevailing MRP (multi-level regression and post-stratification) models generally proved accurate in translating polling data into seat predictions, they also reproduced the longstanding problem of the under-polling of minority groups, [19] which elsewhere missed that 23-year-old first-time campaigner Leanne Mohamed would come within 528 votes of unseating Wes Streeting,

now the new health secretary, in Ilford North. As we learned of the election of four independent Muslim candidates who had each foregrounded the Labour Party’s response to Gaza, a narrative unfolded that these candidates had ‘seized Labour seats thanks to [the] Muslim vote’. [20]

This is not a banal description. Long-established racialised tropes [21] are doing a great deal of work interpreting the ‘Muslim vote’ as the starting pistol for ‘the rise of sectarian voting’, [22] or in seeing not a spectrum of Muslim voices but rather a sinister cabal which offers a ‘glimpse into a horrifying future’. [23] Kemi Badenoch, in opening her Conservative Party leadership campaign, made precisely these alarmist claims, talking about these MPs as promoting ‘sectarian Islamist politics’. [24] These reactions have provided a salutary illustration, as described by the APPG on British Muslims, of how ‘Islamophobia is rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness’. [25]

In contrast, we might consider, first, how accurate it is to claim that we have something like an ethno-religious caucus within the broader electorate and, second, if we do, whether it could be mobilised straightforwardly during a UK election on specific policy questions. For some commentators, [26] the answer to the first question is self-evident and might be traced to Oona King’s loss of Bethnal Green and Bow in the 2005 general election. The foreign policy issue then – Britain’s role in the Iraq war – gave former Labour MP George Galloway his first by-election victory against his old party, in a constituency where the Muslim population then made up 40 per cent (today – with a slightly adjusted boundary – it is 50 per cent).

[16] IRU (2024) ‘Press statement: Islamophobia response’, Press release, 16 February, [www.theiru.org.uk/data-shows-increase-in-islamophobia](http://www.theiru.org.uk/data-shows-increase-in-islamophobia).

[17] British Future (2024) ‘Landmark for representation as diversity of parliament nears that of electorate’. <https://www.britishfuture.org/milestone-for-representation-as-diversity-of-parliament-matches-electorate/>

[18] Ehsan, R. (2024) ‘The successful Muslim Vote campaign is a snapshot of the future of British politics’, The Telegraph 5 July, 2024. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/07/05/britain-has-entered-a-new-era-of-sectarian-politics/>

[19] Jennings, W. and Glaister, I. (2021) ‘The “ethnic data gap” on voters - and why it matters to parties and pollsters’, Sky News. <https://news.sky.com/story/the-ethnic-data-gap-on-voters-and-why-it-matters-to-parties-and-pollsters-12365500>

[20] Robinson, M. (2024) ‘The pro-Palestine independents who turned the Gaza war on Keir’, The Daily Mail, 5 July 2024. <https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13603457/The-pro-Palestine-independents-turned-Gaza-war-Keir-TikTok-barrister-Leicester-optician-Batley-consultant-Blackburn-lawyer-seized-Labour-seats-thanks-Muslim-vote.html>

[21] Jenson, Y. and Meer, N. (eds) (2020) ‘Genealogies of ‘Jews’ and ‘Muslims’: social imaginaries in the race–religion nexus’, *Patterns of Prejudice*, 54 (1–2), 1–214.

[22] Pollard, S. (2024) ‘This election makes Britain ever more vulnerable to sanitised Islamism’, The Jewish Chronicle, 5 July, 2024. <https://www.thejc.com/lets-talk/forget-gaza-the-real-impact-of-last-nights-pro-palestine-winners-will-be-on-labour-mps-sy7ank7x>

[23] Simons, J. W. (2024) ‘Why the Muslim Vote campaign is a glimpse into a horrifying future’, The Telegraph, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2024/07/07/the-muslim-vote-sectarian-insurgency-gaza-shocked-britain/>

[24] Khan, S. (2024) ‘Tory leadership race is hugely important for British Muslims – in more ways than one’, Hyphen, 4 September, <https://hyphenonline.com/2024/09/04/tory-leadership-race-is-important-for-british-muslims-in-more-ways-than-one-robert-jenrick-kemi-badenoch>.

[25] APPG on British Muslims (2018) *Islamophobia Defined: The Inquiry into a Working Definition of Islamophobia*, London, <https://appgbritishmuslims.org/publications>, 11.

[26] Marr, A. (2023) ‘Labour “hemorrhaging” support over Israel Hamas war’, New Statesman, 1 November, [www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikdfqRRgRGo](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikdfqRRgRGo).

# ALTERNATIVE SITES OF MUSLIM CIVIL SOCIETY

to produce and consume  
inclusive forms of media

focus on alternative  
ways of serving local  
communities

develop forums where  
democratic political  
dissent is not deemed a  
security threat

...SPEAKS TO AN  
AMBITION FOR POLITICAL  
PLURALISATION RATHER  
THAN WITHDRAWAL

Nasar Meer

Yet it is typically overlooked that the eligible and registered Muslim electorate in Bethnal Green and Bow would have been much lower, perhaps less than half the number of the actual Muslim population (around 20 per cent in 2005), and that independents typically require a coalition of social groups, often including students and perhaps disaffected voters, to build the requisite anti-incumbent voter coalition. This point was again missed when Galloway repeated his feat on two further occasions, in a 2012 by-election in Bradford West and then, most recently, only a few months ago in the Rochdale by-election. In the latter case, the Labour candidate had been disowned by his party for antisemitism, and Galloway benefited from a turnout of less than 40 per cent. [25]

It is worth reiterating that the demographic distribution of a little over four million Muslims in England, Wales and Scotland means that only around half of this number are of voting age. [28] Add to this the fact that Muslim groups are less likely to be registered [29] (and less likely to possess the documents needed as part of the new voter identification required to cast a ballot), [30] and we find that some of the assumptions require important qualifiers.

In any electoral ward, we should treat with enormous caution the idea that the

percentage of a given Muslim population is equivalent to the size of its Muslim electorate. Hence, in Leicester, a university town, while it is true that 30 per cent of the population of Leicester South ward is Muslim, it is implausible to argue that Jonathan Ashworth's loss could be purely down to a 'Muslim vote', given that not all of that 30 per cent will be able to vote and even within the share that can, there will be enormous diversity in values and opinions. For example, we know that Muslim voters rank domestic issues such as the NHS, inflation, the cost of living and the economy as being of no less importance than international issues, and they are in this respect unremarkable as this means their priorities are aligned with those of other voters drawn to Labour or indeed any other political party. [31]

This is not to deny that Labour saw significant swings against it in seats with the largest concentrations of Muslim voters, since it lost one percentage point from its overall vote share for every 500 or so Muslim voters in the constituencies that it held. [32] This is significant, but it is not the same as a 'Muslim vote' in the sense of a stable and sizeable electoral caucus that can be activated on cue. This does not, of course, preclude Muslim groups from organising as if they can be mobilised in this way, but they do so while being caught on the horns of a dilemma.

[27] UK Parliament (2024) 'Election history of Rochdale', <https://members.parliament.uk/constituency/3700/election-history>.

[28] ONS (Office for National Statistics) (2023) 'Religion by age and sex, England and Wales: Census 2021', 30 January, [www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/religionbyageandsexenglandandwales/census2021](http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/religionbyageandsexenglandandwales/census2021).

[29] Electoral Reform Society (2019) 'Millions missing from the electoral register in event of snap election', 27 September, [www.electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/media-centre/press-releases/millions-missing-from-the-electoral-register-in-event-of-snap-election](http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/media-centre/press-releases/millions-missing-from-the-electoral-register-in-event-of-snap-election).

[30] Operation Black Vote and Runnymede Trust (2024) 'Prime Minister: Scrap unfair voter ID laws', letter to Prime Minister, 25 July, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YmtORlloFjxBflrV6ej2OoRXYjgHfXNP/view>.

[31] Savanta (2024) 'Cultural issues poll: Hyphen', 11 June, <https://savanta.com/knowledge-centre/press-and-polls/cultural-issues-poll-hyphen-11-june-2024>.

[32] The Economist (2024) 'How shallow was Labour's victory in the British election?', 6 July, [www.economist.com/britain/2024/07/06/how-shallow-was-labours-victory-in-the-british-election#content](http://www.economist.com/britain/2024/07/06/how-shallow-was-labours-victory-in-the-british-election#content).

In our previous research with Muslim campaigning organisations, [33] we found that highly democratically engaged Muslim activists were constantly navigating the risk of being characterised as extremists if they raised matters of international relations and Britain’s foreign policy. The continuing jeopardy created by doing so has also been documented by researchers studying peaceful Palestinian solidarity activism. [34] The profound Islamophobia buttressing the double standards on which the assessment of Muslim political engagement rests has long been plain to see. [35]

One route out of this dilemma was to create alternative sites of Muslim civil society, where Muslim communities could produce and consume inclusive forms of media, focus on alternative ways of serving local communities and develop forums where democratic political dissent was not deemed a security threat. If organisations like The Muslim Vote [36] are steering a different course, this speaks to an ambition for political pluralisation rather than withdrawal, and so it is consistent with what has prevailed for other minorities under the terms of a peculiarly British multiculturalism, rather than being driven by, or reducible to, grievances.

Opposition to Labour’s position on Gaza, then, might even be akin to a valence issue, which is not uniquely relevant to Muslim voters, and wrapped up with the broader electorate’s opinion of an incumbent candidate. This point was indicated by Iqbal Mohamed, the independent candidate elected to Dewsbury and Batley, who campaigned on ‘fighting for a ceasefire and two-state peace agreement in Gaza, tackling the cost-of-living crisis, fighting to save the NHS and Dewsbury hospital, funding for all essential services, town regeneration, safer streets and environmental and consumer safety and protection’. [37] It is notable, moreover, that he and other independent candidates such as Shokat Adam and Leanne Mohamed were not entirely inconsistent, in their position on Gaza, with Andy Burnham (Labour mayor of Greater Manchester), Sadiq Khan (Labour mayor of London) or Anas Sarwar (leader of the Scottish Labour Party). In calling for an immediate ceasefire, each of these Labour stalwarts established early on a very different position to that of Keir Starmer.

---

[33] Dobbernack, J., Meer, N. and Modood, T., (2023) ‘Muslim political agency in British politics’, in de Rooij, L. (ed.) *British Muslims and Their Discourses*, Cham, Switzerland: Springer International.

[34] Winter, A. (2024) *Briefing: Islamophobia and Antisemitism*. Community Policy Forum, UK. <https://communitypolicyforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Islamophobia-and-Antisemitism.pdf>

---

[35] *Identities Podcast (2024) Race, Ethnicity and UK General Election*. [Link](#)

[36] See <https://themuslimvote.co.uk/>


[37] *Who Can I Vote For?* (no date) ‘Iqbal Mohamed’, <https://whocanivotefor.co.uk/person/117203/iqbal-hussain-mohamed>.

As we continue to pick over and make sense of these election results, therefore, we should be a great deal less hasty in concluding that where independents stood, *‘it was the Muslim vote wot won it’*.




The truth is likely different: the Muslim electorate is one part of an evolving story of broader democratic engagement among British Muslims – quite the opposite, therefore, of how they have been portrayed.

# REFLECTIONS ON STATE REGULATION OF MUSLIM PUBLIC BEHAVIOUR



## Khadijah Elshayyal

Dr Khadijah Elshayyal is an associate fellow at the Alwaleed Centre, University of Edinburgh, specialising in contemporary British Muslim history. Her research interests lie in the political and cultural activism, advocacy, and representation of Muslims and other minorities in the UK. She is currently working on the Digital British Islam project ([www.digitalbritishislam.com](http://www.digitalbritishislam.com)).



In public and political discourse during the recent general election there has been something of a frenzy around the mobilisation of Muslim voters, in particular their focus on the plausibility of genocide in Gaza and our government's role in its continuation. [38]

We have seen media interviews and opinion pieces on the topic of 'sectarian voting' as well as allegations from MPs (former and newly elected), insinuating that organised tactical voting campaigns were orchestrated by dangerous and subversive Muslim groups, and that such campaigns lower the tone and endanger a (presumably) otherwise civil and safe political landscape. This framing has been rightly drawn into question for its implicit and sometimes explicit suggestion that vocal Muslims who go against the political grain are a hostile threat to a perceived political or social 'order', that they somehow defy unspoken rules of decorum through the ways in which they mobilise and express themselves.

In this piece, I will highlight how the suspicion and anxiety that pro-Palestinian activism has drawn from establishment commentators and politicians is part of a longstanding approach to Muslim agency, and therefore how, at the same time, the Palestine issue is seen by many as a litmus test for the limits of liberal claims about political freedoms and impartiality. I argue that such anxieties about Muslim public agency are telling of a rigid and non-reflexive media and political arrangement that struggles to conceive of possibilities for engagement and interaction with dissent emanating from minoritised voices – framing them from the outset as a destructive threat for who they are, and what their agency is perceived to represent, rather than engaging with the substance of their representations regardless of who they are. Suspicion of and unease about political agency that dissents from parameters drawn by the 'respectable' 'mainstream' has been a consistent feature in British public and political discourse. Over the past few months, this has been made abundantly clear through commentary and interventions around pro-Palestinian activism, alongside the moral panics of the day: Muslims, immigration and national identity.

[38] Siddique, H. (2024) 'What is the genocide convention and how might it apply to the UK and Israel?' Guardian, 3 April, [www.theguardian.com/law/2024/apr/03/what-is-the-genocide-convention-and-how-might-it-apply-to-the-uk-and-israel](http://www.theguardian.com/law/2024/apr/03/what-is-the-genocide-convention-and-how-might-it-apply-to-the-uk-and-israel).



These moral panics, coupled with legal and political gestures, play a role in feeding a notion of Muslim political agency as an affront, and as a destabilising threat to a received idea of what ‘proper’ public order should look like.

Using a series of recent examples, I will illustrate how Muslim public behaviour in an increasing number of public arenas is being subjected to regulation and criminalisation, contextualising Muslims against a historical track record where Muslim voices in public discourse have systematically been marginalised, exceptionalised and disciplined by the media and political classes.

Let us start by considering the now high-profile case of Marieha Hussain, a Muslim woman who was recently charged by the Crown Prosecution Service for racially aggravated public disorder after being photographed holding a satirical placard at a pro-Palestinian demonstration. Heavy-handed policing tactics included the circulation of the photograph on the Metropolitan Police’s social media accounts, which instigated mass online hounding of the individual in question, led to her

dismissal from employment, and undoubtedly rendered her and her family exposed and unsafe. Hussain was eventually acquitted on 13 September 2024; however, during the ten months leading up to this verdict, she endured an unforgiving, somewhat voyeuristic trial by media. [39] Along with the wide circulation of Hussain’s photograph, tabloid ‘exposé’ pieces meant that when, in the run-up to the trial, expert interventions attempted to explain the socio-political context to Hussain’s use of the term ‘coconut’, levels of hysteria and polarisation in public and political discourse had already spiralled and a sober, educative open discussion had become impossible.

While Hussain’s case is far from isolated, it has become somewhat emblematic of politically motivated policing in respect of pro-Palestinian activism, with other examples including surveillance and arrests at student encampments. The mood music for this type of exceptionally heavy policing was set by government ministers designating marches and protest actions as ‘hateful’, ‘extremist’ and antisemitic, [40] and attempts to pass legislation that would penalise the boycotting of trade with Israel. [41] And in recent weeks, we have seen how discourse from politicians

[39] Nels Abbey on X, 14 September 2024: <https://x.com/nelsabbey/status/1834849760475300236>

[40] Syal, R. Sabbagh, D. and Stacey, K. (2023) ‘Suella Braverman calls pro-Palestine demos “hate marches”’ Guardian, 30 October, [www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/October/30/uk-ministers-cobra-meeting-terrorism-threat-israel-hamas-conflict-suella-braverman](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/October/30/uk-ministers-cobra-meeting-terrorism-threat-israel-hamas-conflict-suella-braverman).

[41] Loft, P., Jozepa, I. and Mirza-Davies, J. (2024), ‘Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill 2022–23’, House of Commons Library, 9 January, <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9822>.

[42] Consider for instance comments made by Sarah Edwards MP in the parliamentary chamber on 30th July 2024 where she declares, in relation to a Holiday Inn which housed asylum applicants,


and the media has been directly drawn upon by anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant rioters. [42]

In terms of public institutions, school settings have a long history of being framed as a space of contention when it comes to the exercise of agency by Muslim parents and pupils. As is well documented, [43] this was at its most dramatic and far-reaching during the Trojan Horse affair of 2014. In the same vein, there were heated interventions after the recent High Court ruling in April 2024 to uphold a decision by the Michaela School in Brent to ban Muslim ritual prayer. The decision occupied a focal point for angst over the place of religion in public spaces and institutions, a well-rehearsed debate that manifests periodically and has been noted to offer convenient political currency at opportune moments.

Deeply political and often provocatively polemical herself, the headteacher of Michaela, Katharine Birbalsingh, used the ruling to portray her school as a space where neutrality was intentionally preserved by a refusal to acknowledge or accommodate cultural and religious particularities among

that her constituents ‘want their hotel back’. The following month, the same hotel was subjected to a violent invasion and arson attack, with terrified residents still in their rooms.

[43] Holmwood, J. (2017) *Countering Extremism in British Schools? The truth about the Birmingham Trojan Horse Affair*, Bristol: Policy Press; Holmwood, J. (ed.), ‘Special issue: The Trojan Horse Affair’, *Discover Society* 2(2), <https://discoversociety.org/2-2-the-trojan-horse-affair>.




students. [44] In doing so, she essentially restated the ‘colour-blind’ egalitarian-liberal position – whereby conformity to a ‘majority’ standard is enforced to ‘keep the peace’. A very specific manifestation of patriotic nationalism features strongly in this formulation, and to quote Birbalsingh, ‘self-sacrifice’ is required of all (although she doesn’t address the fact that self-sacrifice will be notably more onerous for the conscience and wellbeing of some than it will be for others). Such a standpoint necessarily considers minorities as a threat to be managed and subdued rather than innately valuable members of the community.

And so the ruling was celebrated widely by a commentariat which has come to find Muslim public visibility wearisome at best, if not inherently threatening. It is far more expedient to declare in newspaper columns and radio interviews that ‘difference’ in schools should be minimised than it is to engage with nuance and be attentive to the enrichment and growth that the validation of young people’s faith commitments can bring.

[44] Gregory, A. (2024) ‘Britain’s “strictest headteacher” statement in full as Muslim pupil loses bid to take part in prayer rituals’, *Independent*, 17 April, [www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/headteacher-katharine-birbalsingh-muslim-pupil-prayer-b2530040.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/headteacher-katharine-birbalsingh-muslim-pupil-prayer-b2530040.html).

ANXIETIES ABOUT MUSLIM  
PUBLIC AGENCY ARE  
TELLING OF A RIGID AND  
NON-REFLEXIVE MEDIA AND  
POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT  
THAT STRUGGLES  
TO CONCEIVE OF  
POSSIBILITIES  
FOR ENGAGEMENT  
AND INTERACTION  
WITH DISSENT EMANATING  
FROM MINORITISED VOICES



Khadijah Elshayyal

In terms of civic life, two successive interventions from former communities secretary Michael Gove exemplify the unabated intolerance towards non-compliant Muslim civic agency. The first was his sinking of the 20-year-old Interfaith Network, by unilaterally withdrawing previously committed government funding that would have kept the organisation afloat, on account of a Muslim trustee's allegedly objectionable associations. The second was his heavily trailed and ultimately highly performative decision to announce a definition of extremism, along with the naming of a number of Muslim community organisations that he deemed could potentially fall foul of it. As I have written elsewhere, [45] there is a consistent thread of policy and media delegitimisation of independent Muslim civic agency through blacklisting, insinuations of guilt by association, and a deployment of orientalist tropes which depict expressions of agency or protest as uncivilised, raucous and sinister.

[45] Elshayyal, K. (2024), 'UK extremism: Naming and shaming of Muslim groups aims to stifle all dissent' Middle East Eye, 27 March, [www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/uk-extremism-naming-shaming-muslim-groups-stifle-all-dissent-aims](http://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/uk-extremism-naming-shaming-muslim-groups-stifle-all-dissent-aims); Elshayyal, K. (2020) 'Securitisation, fundamental British values and the neutralisation of dissent within Muslim discourses in the UK', Maydan, 26 February, <https://themaydan.com/2020/02/securitisation-fundamental-british-values-and-the-neutralisation-of-dissent-within-muslim-discourses-in-the-uk>.



Indeed, as I write this piece, we are seeing, not for the first time, the press raise alarm about Muslim public use of Islamic phrases – with the referencing of 'Allahu akbar' as controversial and 'extremist'. [46] This is an engagement not with the substance of Muslim political claims (in this recent case, police accountability for an incident of brutality towards civilians) but with how political protest and political claims are expressed.


In each of the cases I have discussed, we see the authorities enact or uphold a specific legal or political tool that clearly disproportionately targets political agency by Muslims, or, as in the case of the Michaela verdict, what is perceived or construed as political agency – whether it is the shutting out of Muslim advocates from engagement with politicians and policymakers, or the framing of teenage schoolchildren as disruptive and agenda-driven for their desire to conscientiously practise their faith while at school.

[46] Telegraph (2024) 'Protesters chant "Allahu Akbar" in Rochdale after police officer "stamps on man's head"', 25 July, <https://youtu.be/4vTbg6jUKB8?si=4-UMqXCXZEKV5l3v>; Sky News (2024) 'Jenrick suggests those who shout "Allahu Akbar" on the streets should face arrest', 7 August, [www.youtube.com/watch?v=SoOCRY4vTGc](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SoOCRY4vTGc).

A further common strand between all of the cases that I have highlighted is that they illustrate unease with and the penalisation of non-conforming or dissenting Muslim public behaviours, especially those that appear coordinated. So, daily ritual prayers by school pupils are perceived through the lens of their being a congregational act, and despite their being primarily a devotional act of worship, this automatically places them somehow in the conceptual territory of being an act of political agency, prompting articulations of how 'secularism' is understood and implemented in a school setting and a culture-wars-esque public debate about the limits of religion in public life. Participating in Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) actions is seen by politicians as a threat, not because of the intentionality of individual decisions about ethical consumerism but because of it being a concerted action coordinated between groups and movements. And the coming together of Muslims in the civic space through formal representative organisations or campaigns to exercise political leverage and seek to influence policy directions is seen as 'sectarian' and 'undemocratic', rather than as an earnest engagement with a political system in which interest groups have long been an integral and accepted feature.

Dissent that appears to be coordinated seems to trigger a sense of insecurity within establishment spaces. It is as if to say that any collective expression of agency by establishment-critical collectives is by default a threat not to be tolerated. Of course there is an irony here, because we would be forgiven for asking: what indeed is our party political system, if not the active coordination between people of common political persuasion organised into named factions, with organisational aims, objectives and leadership, so as to create maximum impact towards achieving common political goals? Our much-prized parliamentary democracy – that fundamental British value which our school pupils and new citizens are required to learn about and show respect for and are encouraged to engage with – has coordinated political organising, through political parties and interest groups, at its core. This takes me back full circle to my opening reflection on the framing of Muslim-led tactical voting as 'sectarian'.

**Much as it may hope to, bad-faith and inaccurate framing will not contain Muslim political agency, not least in the present moment when we are witnessing Islamophobic violence on our streets as mainstream politicians and public institutions maintain a muted distance.**



**It is therefore more apt for the political and media class to catch up with the rest of society and consider the growing recognition among the minoritised and the disenfranchised of the unsustainability of a rigid conformity to political engagement on terms that have historically been developed and maintained to advantage the establishment.**

# ISLAMOPHOBIA IN HIGHER EDUCATION

## Norms of inequality in Muslim students' university experiences



### Maisha Islam

Dr Maisha Islam is the Doctoral College research culture lead for equality, diversity and inclusion at the University of Southampton.



At a time of chronic geopolitical crisis such as we have seen since 7 October 2023, it is understandable that people around the world will be in some state of shock and distress. While it is reasonable to assume that systems and structures can negate any such evolving harmful effects, we see the opposite in UK higher education (HE) particularly with respect to Muslim students.

This is especially concerning given the inequalities that Muslim students experience in accessing, succeeding in and progressing from HE. From broken governmental promises of 'alternative student finance' systems to evidence of a Muslim student degree-awarding gap, Muslim students experience disadvantage at every observable point within their HE journeys. [47]

[47] Stevenson, J. (2018) *Muslim Students in UK Higher Education: Issues of Inequality and Inequity*, London: Bridge Institute.

Now, with recent reports of Muslim students being falsely accused of antisemitism or having their elected positions threatened due to their publicly advocating for Palestinian human rights, a worrying picture emerges of contemporary UK HE. This chapter describes how Muslim students face continuing threats to their well-established history of political activism within HE spaces, posing questions about their right to freedom of speech. Ultimately, we are witnessing a lack of parity in protection, provision and priority for Muslim students during such unprecedented times.

With the ongoing claim of genocidal acts in Gaza [48] and recent racist rioting in England fuelled by anti-immigrant and Islamophobic sentiment, this chapter also explores how the current climate impacts Muslim student voice, sense of belonging and student experience. These concepts have proven to mediate student success and retention. Namely, entrenched Islamophobia within universities can lead to a silencing and minoritising effect whereby Muslim students are socialised into settling for 'less-than' university experiences. Despite these acute experiences of inequality, this chapter concludes on a note of hope that Muslim students can continue to exert resistance and activism and to be at the forefront of social justice change.

[48] Human Rights Council (2024), 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967', 24 March, [www.un.org/unispal/document/anatomy-of-a-genocide-report-of-the-special-rapporteur-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-palestinian-territory-occupied-since-1967-to-human-rights-council-advance-unedited-version-a-hrc-55](http://www.un.org/unispal/document/anatomy-of-a-genocide-report-of-the-special-rapporteur-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-palestinian-territory-occupied-since-1967-to-human-rights-council-advance-unedited-version-a-hrc-55).

## Structural inequalities facing Muslim students

Conceptions of Islamophobia within HE must be understood as a structural racism which disproportionately disadvantages and negatively impacts the experiences of Muslim students (and staff). [49] This is in addition to the micro, covert and overt discrimination faced due to their Muslim identity. These understandings have been established for decades [50] and, like other forms of racism, Islamophobia's manifestations are fluid and contextual. [51] Within UK HE, Muslim students comprise around 10 per cent of the student population. [52] While this is cause for celebration, a closer interrogation of Muslim students' access to, success in and progression from university exposes myriad structural and institutional inequalities. [53]

For example, contrary to the 2015–2024 Conservative government's Levelling Up agenda and former prime minister David Cameron's promise in 2013 to institute alternative student finance (i.e., an alternative

payment system removing interest-bearing tuition fees and living cost loans), around 100,000 Muslim students have either forgone or self-funded a university education – with those opting for traditional loans feeling that they have compromised their faith. [54] This is in addition to the current cost-of-living crisis, where Muslims already comprise one of Britain's most socio-economically disadvantaged groups. [55]

The institutional Islamophobia that Muslim students face while at university is seen in a degree-awarding gap, i.e. the difference between the numbers of Muslim students and those from other religious groups being awarded a 2:1 or first-class honours degree – Muslim students currently representing the worst-performing religious group in UK HE. [56] This is compounded by the fact that one in three Muslim students experience Islamophobic abuse, with many universities poorly equipped to effectively tackle the issue. [57] This may explain why Muslim students have the lowest retention rates out of all faith groups. [58] Unfortunately, those

Muslim students obtaining 'good' degrees are still further disadvantaged in the labour market, with financial, social and academic concerns heightened at the postgraduate level. [59]

With such burgeoning inequities, one might assume that institutional and sector policy would be eager to alleviate such structural disadvantage. Instead, the reverse is true, with Muslim students subject to over-amplified concerns about their presence on UK campuses while sector bodies and universities are simultaneously deafeningly silent on their contemporary hardships. This includes the recent race riots in England [60] and the ongoing violence in Gaza, with few HE institutions seeming to address the Islamophobia that underpins the inadequate institutional response. [61]

Where many students have expressed solidarity with Palestinians and called for a ceasefire (calls which have widespread support among the general public), we see intense demonisation of this, further

marginalising and harming Muslim students. This includes false claims of antisemitism targeted at Muslims and academics, including Baroness Jacqueline Foster's public attack against Muslim PhD student Melika Gorgianeh on *University Challenge*, [62] and then-science minister Michelle Donelan's claims of extremism against two academics. [63] Both Baroness Foster and Donelan have apologised and paid legal costs since their claims were proven to be false. At the heart of many of these attacks is the conflation of antisemitism with anti-Zionist beliefs, [64] impacting students and staff with legitimate criticism of the Israeli government. [65] Without comprehensive governmental guidance on this issue, universities are left ill equipped, with often confusing and contradictory advice. [66]

[49] Shaheen, M. (2024) 'Islamophobia in higher education environments', *New Directions for Higher Education* 206: 41–52.

[50] Runnymede Trust (1997) *Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All*, London, www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-a-challenge-for-us-all.

[51] Modood, T. (2023) 'Islamophobia, antisemitism and the struggle for recognition: The politics of definitions', in Feldman, D. and Volocici, M. (eds) *Antisemitism, Islamophobia and the Politics of Definition*, Cham: Springer International.

[52] Khan, D. (2022) 'The representation of Muslims in higher education', 11 October, <https://bookdown.org/content/30c7aefc-cd68-4fc6-9650-dba903e26eec>.

[53] Stevenson, J., Demack, S., Stiell, B., Abdi, M., Clarkson, L., Ghaffar, F. and Hassan, S. (2017) *The Social Mobility Challenges faced by Young Muslims*, London: Social Mobility Commission, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/642220/Young\\_Muslims\\_SMC.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/642220/Young_Muslims_SMC.pdf).

[54] Muslim Census (2021) 'Levelling up unequal access to university education', 11 October, <https://muslimcensus.co.uk/unequal-access-to-university-education>.

[55] ONS (2023), 'Religion by housing, health, employment, and education, England and Wales: Census 2021', 24 March, [Link](#)

[56] Gholami, R. (2021) 'Critical race theory and Islamophobia: Challenging Inequity in higher education', *Race Ethnicity and Education* 24(3): 319–337.

[57] National Union of Students (NUS) (2018) *The Experience of Muslim Students in 2017–18*, Stockport, [www.nusconnect.org.uk/resources/the-experience-of-muslim-students-in-2017-18](http://www.nusconnect.org.uk/resources/the-experience-of-muslim-students-in-2017-18); Universities UK (2021) 'Tackling Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred: Practical guidance for UK universities', [www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/what-we-do/policy-and-research/publications/tackling-islamophobia-and-anti-muslim](http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/what-we-do/policy-and-research/publications/tackling-islamophobia-and-anti-muslim).

[58] Malik, A. and Wykes, E. (2018) *British Muslims in UK Higher Education: Socio-Political, Religious and Policy Considerations*, London: Bridge Institute, [www.azizfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/British-Muslims-in-UK-HE.pdf](http://www.azizfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/British-Muslims-in-UK-HE.pdf).

[59] Samatar, A. and Sardar, Z. (2023) *Transitions: British Muslims between Undergraduate and PGT Studies*, London: Aziz Foundation, [www.azizfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/British-Muslims-UPGT-FINAL-2.pdf](http://www.azizfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/British-Muslims-UPGT-FINAL-2.pdf).

[60] Runnymede Trust (2024) 'UK racist riots: Open letter to Keir Starmer from 80 anti-racist and migrants' rights organisations', 5 August, [www.runnymedetrust.org/news/uk-racist-riots-open-letter-to-keir-starmer-from-80-anti-racist-and-migrants-rights-organisations](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/news/uk-racist-riots-open-letter-to-keir-starmer-from-80-anti-racist-and-migrants-rights-organisations).

[61] Blake, S. (2024) 'How universities respond to the riots needs careful consideration', *WonkHE*, 8 August, <https://wonkhe.com/blogs/how-universities-respond-to-the-riots-needs-careful-consideration>.

[62] Rahman Lowe Solicitors (2024) 'Rahman Lowe secure significant compensation from Baroness who falsely accused University Challenge student of antisemitism over blue octopus mascot', [www.rllaw.co.uk/rahman-lowes-secure-significant-compensation-from-baroness-who-falsely-accused-university-challenge-student-of-antisemitism](http://www.rllaw.co.uk/rahman-lowes-secure-significant-compensation-from-baroness-who-falsely-accused-university-challenge-student-of-antisemitism).

[63] Adams, R. and Walker, P. (2024) 'UK science minister apologises and pays damages after academic's libel action', *Guardian*, 5 March, [www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/March/05/uk-science-minister-michelle-donelan-apologises-and-pays-damages-after-academics-libel-action](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/March/05/uk-science-minister-michelle-donelan-apologises-and-pays-damages-after-academics-libel-action).

[64] Feldman, D. (2013) 'Anti-Zionism and antisemitism in Britain', in *Proceedings of the International conference 'Antisemitism in Europe Today: The Phenomena, the Conflicts'*, Jewish Museum Berlin, 8–9 November, 2.

[65] Davies, C. and Sherwood, H. (2024) 'UK professor suffered discrimination due to anti-Zionist beliefs, tribunal rules', *Guardian*, 5 February, [www.theguardian.com/education/2024/February/05/uk-professor-suffered-discrimination-due-to-anti-zionist-beliefs-tribunal-rules](http://www.theguardian.com/education/2024/February/05/uk-professor-suffered-discrimination-due-to-anti-zionist-beliefs-tribunal-rules)

[66] Feldman, D. (2020) 'The government should not impose a faulty definition of antisemitism on universities', *Guardian*, 2 December, [www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/December/02/the-government-should-not-impose-a-faulty-definition-of-antisemitism-on-universities](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/December/02/the-government-should-not-impose-a-faulty-definition-of-antisemitism-on-universities).

The previous government similarly adopted an indifference to prioritising Islamophobia within HE. As alluded to, this includes its overwhelming lobbying of UK universities to adopt the highly contentious International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) definition of antisemitism which conflates criticism of Israel with anti-Jewish sentiment, [67] while remaining silent on whether universities should adopt any definition of Islamophobia. Although 119 universities across England, Scotland and Wales have adopted the IHRA definition, [68] only 21 UK universities have adopted the APPG definition of Islamophobia. [69] And, although it is currently halted due to legal challenge, [70] a multi-million-pound government tender to tackle antisemitism in education also underlines the lack of parity in funding and resources to tackle Islamophobia. Finally, a government crackdown on pro-Palestinian protests and encampments, despite recent focus on protecting freedom of speech on university campuses, signals clearly whose freedom of speech is 'acceptable'. [71]



These examples are not singular occurrences but represent a pattern of misrecognition, indignity and lacking protection afforded to Muslim students within UK HE: a consistent double standard whereby Muslims are regarded largely as a threat, unworthy of institutional defence despite increases in Islamophobic hate crime. [72] It is important that government resets the conversation and engages with stakeholders to ensure that the duty of care afforded students has parity across all student communities.

[67] Gould, R. (2020) 'The IHRA definition of antisemitism: Defining antisemitism by erasing Palestinians', *The Political Quarterly* 91(4): 825–832.

[68] Union of Jewish Students (2024) 'Combatting antisemitism: IHRA campaign', [www.ujs.org.uk/ihra\\_campaign](http://www.ujs.org.uk/ihra_campaign).

[69] National Secular Society (2023) 'Islamophobia definitions threaten free speech at 20+ universities', 23 November, [www.secularism.org.uk/news/2023/11/islamophobia-definitions-threaten-free-speech-at-20-universities](http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2023/11/islamophobia-definitions-threaten-free-speech-at-20-universities).

[70] Hilton, E. (2024) 'Diaspora Alliance is taking the government to court', *Crowd Justice*, [www.crowdjustice.com/case/fightantisemitism](http://www.crowdjustice.com/case/fightantisemitism).

[71] Department for Education (2021) 'Higher education: Free speech and academic freedom', policy paper, 16 February, [www.gov.uk/government/publications/higher-education-free-speech-and-academic-freedom](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/higher-education-free-speech-and-academic-freedom).

[72] Monetta, S. (2024) 'Anti-Muslim cases surge in UK since Hamas attacks, charity finds', *BBC News*, 22 February, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-68374372](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-68374372).

# ONE IN THREE MUSLIM STUDENTS EXPERIENCE ISLAMOPHOBIC ABUSE.

Maisha Islam

## Implications for Muslim student experience and sense of belonging

While public instances of Islamophobia are all too regular in UK HE, what about the everyday experiences of Muslim students at university? The literature details how the academic and social facets of campuses similarly show disregard for appropriately accommodating Muslim students. This includes Eurocentric and colonial teaching content; [73] lacking accommodation for religious provision, e.g. halal food and prayer space [74] and considerations during Ramadan; [75] few religiously appropriate social events; [77] over-surveillance legitimated by the Prevent duty; [77] and minimal representative mechanisms through which to advocate Muslim-specific concerns. Recognising that many Muslim students hold intersectional characteristics, multiple marginalities become a signature characteristic of Muslim student experiences. [78]

This negligence affects Muslim students' sense of belonging at their universities, consequently denying them equitable student voice and experience in comparison with

[73] Shaffait, H. (2019) *Inclusivity at University: Muslim Student Experiences*, London: Kings College London, [www.kcl.ac.uk/geography/assets/kcl-sspp-muslim-policy-report-digital-aw.pdf](http://www.kcl.ac.uk/geography/assets/kcl-sspp-muslim-policy-report-digital-aw.pdf).

[74] Islam, M., Lowe T. and Jones, G. (2019) 'A "satisfied settling"? Investigating a sense of belonging for Muslim students in a UK small-medium higher education institution', *Student Engagement in Higher Education Journal* 2(2): 79-104.

[75] Islam, M. (2019) 'Muslim students need exam adjustments during Ramadan', *WonkHE*, 21 November, <https://wonkhe.com/blogs/muslim-students-need-exam-adjustments-during-ramadan>.

[76] Hopkins, P. (2011) 'Towards critical geographies of the university campus: Understanding the contested experiences of Muslim students', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 36(1): 157-169.

their non-Muslim peers. [79]

My research notes how these direct and indirect experiences lead to a silencing effect and a 'satisfied settling' in Muslim students' university experiences. [80] Figure 1 describes this occurring in a staged process, whereby Muslim students recognise that their needs come secondary to non-Muslim majoritarian norms and values. For many, earlier educational experiences have acclimated them to exclusion within educational institutions, leading to their having little expectation of religious needs being prioritised at university. Consequently, Muslim students adopt self-accommodative strategies to navigate university life rather than feeling empowered to challenge and change inequitable structures, systems and practices.

Despite reporting feelings of belonging, students' contradictory experiences and acute realisation of Islamophobic climates denote a 'satisfied settling', i.e. unconsciously justifying not having access to 'a richer and more fulfilled university experience in relation to religious needs' and settling for less-than. [82]

[77] Awan, I. (2012) "'I am a Muslim not an extremist": How the Prevent strategy has constructed a "suspect" community', *Politics & Policy* 40(6): 1158-1185.

[78] Ramadan, I. (2022) 'When faith intersects with gender: The challenges and successes in the experiences of Muslim women academics', *Gender and Education* 34(1): 33-48.

[79] Islam, M. (2021) *Building Belonging: Developing Religiously Inclusive Cultures for Muslim Students in Higher Education*, York and London: Advance HE, [www.advance-he.ac.uk/knowledge-hub/building-belonging-developing-religiously-inclusive-cultures-muslim-students-higher](http://www.advance-he.ac.uk/knowledge-hub/building-belonging-developing-religiously-inclusive-cultures-muslim-students-higher).

[80] Islam, M. and Mercer-Mapstone, L. (2021) "'University is a non-Muslim experience, you know? The experience is as good as it can be": Satisfied settling in Muslim students' experiences and implications for Muslim student voice', *British Educational Research Journal* 47(5): 1388-1415.




Figure 1 - A staged process of Muslim students' 'satisfied settling'  
Source - Islam and Mercer-Mapstone (2021).

## Contemporary Muslim activism and resistance

Regardless of these normalised structural inequities, Muslim students have historically displayed activism, resistance and hope, primarily driven through faith and a strong sense of social justice. For example, Islamic student societies have consistently engaged in lobbying activities to advocate for issues related to religious needs. [82] In collaboration with non-Muslim peers, Muslims have historically championed pro-Palestinian movements and global politics focusing on social justice. [83] However, contemporary student activism, considering the claims of genocidal acts in Gaza, [84] has seen a step-change in perceptions and large-scale support for pro-Palestinian and anti-Islamophobic movements on university campuses – largely due to social media televising what will likely

[81] Islam, Lowe and Jones, 'A "Satisfied Settling"?', 94.

[82] Choudhury, T. (2017) 'Campaigning on campus: Student Islamic societies and counterterrorism', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40(12): 1004-1022.

[83] NUS, *The Experience of Muslim Students*.

[84] Foulkes, I. (2024) 'Gaza war: UN rights expert accuses Israel of acts of genocide', *BBC News*, 26 March, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68667556](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68667556).

be known as the most brutal attacks on a population in modern times. [85]


The existence of around 34 pro-Palestinian encampments across the UK symbolises the overwhelming support that issues previously championed largely by Muslim student leaders and activists have garnered – uniting Muslim, non-Muslim, Jewish and Palestinian students alike. [86] Common demands of student activists from their universities include condemnation of the educational destruction (and wider infrastructure) in Gaza; disclosing and divesting from funding, investments and partnerships holding direct or indirect ties to Israel; adopting definitions of Islamophobia; and providing scholarships for displaced Palestinian students. [87]

[85] Al-Nahari, A.S. (2024) 'Gaza: The world's most documented, unchecked genocide', *Arab News*, 21 May, [www.arabnews.com/node/2513826/gaza-worlds-most-documented-unchecked-genocide](http://www.arabnews.com/node/2513826/gaza-worlds-most-documented-unchecked-genocide).

[86] Bains, D. (2024) "'We're in it for the long haul": 4 British students on why they're joining campus protests across the UK', *British Vogue*, 4 June, [www.vogue.co.uk/article/pro-palestine-student-camps-uk-protests](http://www.vogue.co.uk/article/pro-palestine-student-camps-uk-protests).

[87] Palestine Solidarity Network (2024) 'Petition by Palestine Solidarity Network: University of Southampton', <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fIU36swkoT-9btOgAXNozn72eI6LuG9meBM-WlIjww/edit>.

This sustained and largely peaceful activism has led to several changes in university procurement policies. Trinity College Dublin has agreed to divest from Israeli companies within Occupied Palestinian Territory; [88] Swansea University has divested £5m from Barclays Bank; [89] and Goldsmiths, University of London, has implemented a new ethical investment policy and will provide scholarships for Palestinian students. [90]



While student activists continue to face hostility and are met with police crackdowns and violent arrests under the instruction of their universities, [91] a newly formed coalition of student organisations will continue to scrutinise and challenge how HE institutions navigate their investment policies [92] – particularly, how those decisions align to the broader ethical responsibilities universities have towards Muslim and non-Muslim students.

---

[88] Sharkey, K. and Fox, M. (2024) 'Trinity College Dublin protest camp to end after agreement made', BBC News, 8 May, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cv2jlp9yl7zo](https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cv2jlp9yl7zo).

[89] Foster, T. (2024) 'Swansea students victorious over divestment demands', Socialist Worker, 7 June, <https://socialistworker.co.uk/palestine-2023/swansea-students-victorious-over-divestment-demands>.

---

[90] Cawkell, F. (2024) 'Goldsmiths pro-Palestine encampment ends after five weeks as uni accepts protestors' demands', The UCL Tab, 15 May, <https://thetab.com/uk/london/2024/05/15/goldsmiths-pro-palestine-encampment-ends-after-five-weeks-as-uni-accepts-protestors-demands-53155>.

[91] Mirza, M. (2024) 'War on Gaza: Why are UK universities inviting police to curb student protests?' Middle East Eye, 29 June, [www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/gaza-war-uk-universities-police-crack-down-protesters-why](https://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/gaza-war-uk-universities-police-crack-down-protesters-why).

[92] Student Federation for a Liberated Palestine (2024) 'Manifesto', Instagram, 16 August, [www.instagram.com/p/C-vQ5PJolye/?img\\_index=1](https://www.instagram.com/p/C-vQ5PJolye/?img_index=1).

# AN EQUITABLE STUDENT VOICE



# THE MUSLIM PRISON POPULATION



## Raheel Mohammed

Raheel Mohammed is the founder and director of Maslaha, an organisation that seeks to change and challenge the conditions that create inequalities and racism for Muslim communities in the areas of education, gender, criminal justice, health and negative media coverage in a continued climate of Islamophobia.

Before the bombs began to fall on Gaza, it was often described as the world's largest open-air prison – a horrific description that has been made redundant by what many describe as a genocide as we witness the killing of tens of thousands of Palestinians since 7 October 2023.

This is shaping a new generation of Muslim children who are experiencing Islamophobia in schools or in the streets simply because they are asking why Palestinian lives matter less. [93]

Gaza has also shown and reminded us of the different forms that prisons can take and how they are sites of warfare that cut across domestic and international borders and always target oppressed communities. [94] As Ruth Wilson Gilmore explains in her book *Golden Gulag*, prison expansion amounts to 'the abandonment of one set of public mandates in favour of another – of social welfare for domestic warfare if you will'. [95]

This chapter will explore the far-reaching nature of this carceral warfare, which enables a concentrated form of Islamophobia to control and regulate every aspect of a Muslim prisoner's life. However, prison also reflects similar tools of control in wider society, especially when Muslim life rebels against notions of the right kind of British citizen, or when Muslim children demand answers about the Palestinian children who are being killed every day.

The revolutionary prison activist Martin Sostre, who fought for the right to practise Islam in US prisons in the 1970s, said:

*Prison is a closed society with 40-foot walls and the public can't see in. That made it easy to violate someone's human rights. I consider the outside only a minimum security and inside prison is sort of a maximum security. [96]*

[93] See Maslaha's education work, which has been supporting young people, families and teachers in response to the genocide in Gaza: Maslaha (2024) 'Palestine lesson prompts', [www.maslaha.org/Project/palestine-lesson-prompts](http://www.maslaha.org/Project/palestine-lesson-prompts).

[94] Burton, O. (2023) *Tip of the Spear: Black Radicalism, Prison Repression, and the Long Attica Revolt*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

[95] Wilson Gilmore, R. (2007) *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalising California*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

[96] Shapiro, J. (2017) 'How one inmate changed the prison system from the inside', *The Code Switch Podcast*, NPR, 14 April, [www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/04/14/507297469/how-one-inmate-changed-the-prison-system-from-the-inside](http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/04/14/507297469/how-one-inmate-changed-the-prison-system-from-the-inside).

With the dramatic increase in the number of Muslims in prison, they now make up 18 per cent of the population, compared with 6 per cent of the general population. [97] Maslaha has reported on how Muslim prisoners are denied the fundamental right to worship:

*They know that's the one thing that will get to a Muslim, if he's not going to get to Friday prayers.*

*That's their best threat.*

*'Shut your mouth or you're never coming to Friday prayers again.' Any officer will use that on you. When does he have the right to tell me when I can go and pray to my Lord. [98]*

Over the past few years working with incarcerated Muslims, the 'Friday prayer question' was repeated and confirmed as a normal occurrence in prison.

We heard how Muslims are regularly banned from Friday prayers for minor infractions of prison rules: they told us that the prison authorities knew how much these prayers meant to them and would deliberately use the threat of denying them their religious freedom as leverage.


This is not a broken system but one that is working as intended. [99] It is a system that has developed to contain the so-called Muslim threat both in and outside of the prison system.

---

[97] Sturge, G. (2024), 'UK Prison Population Statistics', House of Commons Library, 8 July, <https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/SNo4334/SNo4334.pdf>

[98] Mohammed, Time to End the Silence.

[99] Wilson Gilmore, R. (2022) *Abolition Geography: Essays Towards Liberation*, London: Verso.



With Sostre's statement in mind, it is not surprising, therefore, that the Muslim prison population has more than doubled since the beginning of the so-called War on Terror, post-9/11. We also have the introduction of the Prevent strategy (2003), which seeks to root out extremism before it happens, legally requiring public sector workers, doctors, teachers and social care workers to work in what is sinisterly described as 'the pre-criminal space'. And again, it is Muslims who have been disproportionately targeted.

In 2002 Muslims in prison numbered 5,502; the latest figures show that this number has increased to 15,594. [100]

The wider analysis in Hall et al.'s *Policing the Crisis* [101] is instructive as it shows how the moral panic about muggings and Black communities in the 1970s and 1980s was transplanted from a US context to a UK context. The police, the judiciary and the media did not 'simply respond to moral panic', leading in turn to an over-policing of Black communities: they formed 'part of the circle out of which moral panics' developed. [102]

---

[100] Prison Reform Trust (2024) *Bromley Briefings Prison Factfile*, London, <https://prisonreformtrust.org.uk/publication/bromley-briefings-prison-factfile-february-2024>.

[101] Hall, S., Roberts, B., Clarke, J., Jefferson, T. and Critcher, C. (1978) *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State, and the Law*, London: The MacMillian Press.

## The right kind of citizen

In the eyes of the criminal legal system and the broader carceral system, Islamic religiosity and the critical, political Muslim are incompatible with ideas of what makes a good citizen. In fact, they are often linked to extremism or seen as a threat.

Carceral tools such as the prison system and Prevent, embedded in public services, are ready to criminalise or denigrate these identities. 'There must be something that is wrong in the religion', said one non-Muslim prisoner during a focus group about why Muslim men weren't accessing a mental health support service. The prison officer present nodded in agreement.


The criminalising potential is ever present: think of the 'See it, Say it, Sort it' campaign – an incantation on UK public transport reminding travellers that they have a duty to police situations, and indeed people, that 'don't look right'. It's so pervasive that children repeat the announcement as if it were a nursery rhyme. For other travellers, it carries more ominous and threatening connotations, understanding 'not right' to read as 'Muslim'.

Since 7 October 2023, this criminalisation of Muslim communities who want to exercise their democratic right to free speech has intensified.

---

[102] Hall et al., *Policing the Crisis*, 52.


[103] Samira, A. (2023) 'Protecting children as a teacher means speaking up about Israel's crimes in Gaza', *The New Arab*, 23 October, [www.newarab.com/opinion/silence-violence-uk-schools-complicit-gaza-genocide](http://www.newarab.com/opinion/silence-violence-uk-schools-complicit-gaza-genocide).



We have heard accounts of Muslim pupils being punished for supporting Palestinian rights. One child was given an external exclusion for chanting 'free, free Palestine'. Another child was referred to Prevent for saying 'from the river to the sea' as they queued for a school trip. Parents who organised bake sales for Ukraine have been told they cannot organise similar sales for Palestinian children.

These Muslim families are seen to have become a threat because they are politicised and refuse to remain silent in the face of what is regarded as genocide being committed against the Palestinian people. [103]





CARCERAL TOOLS  
SUCH AS THE  
PRISON SYSTEM  
AND PREVENT,  
EMBEDDED IN  
PUBLIC SERVICES,  
ARE READY TO  
CRIMINALISE OR  
DENIGRATE THESE  
IDENTITIES.



Raheel Mohammed

In prison, the amplification of the idea of Muslim extremism or the ‘Muslim threat’ overrides any mandatory guidelines that prison officers are meant to follow. For instance, the Incentives and Privileges scheme is intended to give prison governors levers to encourage good behaviour. Research has shown that Black and brown prisoners are more often likely to receive punitive measures, while white prisoners are more likely to be rewarded. [104]

Engaging with education or training workshops would normally be seen as ‘engaging in good conduct’, but as one Muslim prison worker explained, it led to accusations of extremism against both him and the Muslim prisoners:

Non-Muslim worker:  
*You shouldn’t speak in a different language to the prisoners.*


Muslim worker:  
*Why? Is it because you’re scared I’m going to get corrupted?’*

Non-Muslim worker:  
*You’re more prone to corruption.*

He also explained that ‘When I asked the Equalities officer, she said: “Well, you shouldn’t be speaking in a different language”.’

This shows the level of paranoia in the prison system, where potential extremism is seen as contagious. The sounds of Arabic or ‘foreignness’ related to Islam causes a reflex response of fear and control. In contrast, for Muslim prisoners the sound of Arabic, the call of Azan from one cell to Muslims in other cells, brings a sense of comfort and of brotherhood. It allows them to transcend the walls of a prison.

[104] Clinks (2014) *The Young Review: Improving Outcomes for Young Black and/or Muslim Men in the Criminal Justice System*, Mildenhall, Suffolk, [www.clinks.org/publication/young-review](http://www.clinks.org/publication/young-review).



But crude narratives have very direct consequences as they foster a climate of fear and inevitable punitive measures.

The true extent of Islamophobia in the prison system and its psychological, emotional and physical damage is silenced in standard reports by the government, the charity sector and academia. The level of detail and analysis earlier in this chapter will not be present in such reports, because there is a lack of proximity to the communities affected.

Nor do they analyse the relationship with wider political imperatives and globalised Islamophobia, instead focusing on overcrowding or the need for more opportunities for education or training in prison. This kind of reformist approach looks to tweak the system, to make it run better, rather than at the root causes of structural racism. Such reports and initiatives ‘act as safety valves’ to ‘derail dangerous thought’. [105] There are also reports which are complicit in exacerbating Islamophobia and the moral panic about supposed extremism.

If the true extent of Islamophobia is missing from formal records, so is the resistance from Muslims in prison.

[105] *Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.

Muslim prisoners are known to organise into communities to keep themselves safe in a violent environment. These can often wrongly be described as ‘gangs’ in order to perpetuate perceptions of an ‘extremist problem’. [106] Instead, these organised communities contain ‘an expansive register of minor gestures, ways of sustaining and creating life, caring for one another’. [107]

*You see that especially in A Cats or B Cats [types of prison]. If he doesn't have money, the brothers will organise a care package for someone new on the wing or a revert, or cook for him. People do share clothes.*

*If the brothers have been on the wing for a time they will be accommodating to other Muslims – this is my wing and I'm going to look out for them.*

*They [the prison officers] don't like it. The racist ones don't like it that we have it organised. They don't like it that Muslims look out for each other. They don't like it we eat together and cook together.*

## Conclusion

The last statements above from the violent environment of a prison can help to show us a way to build a counter-movement against the root causes of Islamophobia and other oppressions – one that is organised across our different communities experiencing the fact that prison, and racism, will shorten our lives.

We have seen similar organising among parents and their children who are traumatised by the silence of schools and politicians about Gaza. We have also seen it in response to the racist violence on the streets in summer 2024, where communities congregated to protect each other.

The response to structural racism requires building counter-narratives and instigating an ‘archival war’, [108] reframing who creates knowledge and for what purpose.

Counter-narratives should be in the service of building alternative community structures or programmes that protect us from over-policing. These structures should also have the capacity to evolve so that in the future they will continue to meet the needs of our communities rather than reacting to the harms of carceral systems.


We will then no longer be ‘forced into the invidious position of proving our humanity ... and yet the evidence is too often submitted to the white racists for sanction’. [109]

Our Coming Home project, a politically conscious therapeutic service, is our attempt at this. Like similar projects, it mobilises our different communities to respond to the harms experienced by those released from prison and their families. It is granular in detail and strategic in direction.

The response from the government to Muslim communities who are understandably afraid after the racist violence of the summer is to provide more policing or security for mosques. Muslim and other organisations are asking for greater use of counter-terrorism laws against far-right groups.

However, any expansion of carceral systems will only harm Muslim and other communities who are over-policed.

Instead, rather than relying on more policing and prisons, a response built on community knowledge and expertise to enable liberated lives must be the way forward.



**OUR WORK SHOULD ‘NOT TRACE THE GIVEN MAP OF A BETTER REALITY BUT IMPROVISE AN INSPIRED SKETCH OF IT’.** [110]

[106] Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (2022) *Terrorism in Prisons*, London: HMSO, <https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Terrorism-in-Prisons.pdf>.

[107] Hartman, *Scenes of Subjection*.

[108] Burton, *Tip of the Spear*.

[109] Rodney, R. (2019) *The Groundings with my Brothers*, London: Verso.

[110] Heaney, S. (1989) *The Government of the Tongue*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

# PREVENT

## Layla Aitlhadj

Dr Layla Aitlhadj is director of Prevent Watch, a community-led initiative which supports people impacted by the Prevent duty.

The UK's Prevent duty, part of the government's counter-terrorism strategy, aims to 'stop people from being drawn into terrorism' [111] by pre-emptively identifying individuals deemed 'susceptible' to radicalisation based on a set of extremism risk factors, listed under what is called Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ (ERG22+). [112]

The study which led to the development of these 22 risk factors was based on Muslim prisoners convicted of terrorism-related offences. [113] Although the authors insisted that their results were not for general application, these risk factors were later rolled out nationally as part of Prevent training for public sector workers. [114]

In 2015, more than a decade after its inception in 2003, the Prevent duty became a statutory obligation for schools and other public sector institutions. This meant that educators, healthcare providers and local authorities were legally compelled to identify and report individuals they deemed at risk of radicalisation. However, the criteria for identifying radicalisation were vague and relied on stereotypical assumptions about Muslim practices. This, combined with biased media reporting and political rhetoric, led to a disproportionate focus on Muslim communities.

The establishment of the statutory Prevent duty entrenched discriminatory practices in UK institutions by conflating Islamic practices with extremism. This has led to unjust profiling of Muslims and the reinforcement of harmful stereotypes. For example, in the NHS Muslims are referred to Prevent eight times more often than non-Muslims. [115]

Today, Prevent is described as a cornerstone of the UK's counter-terrorism strategy, yet its effectiveness in stopping terrorism is highly contested due to the lack of any conclusive evidence. In fact, in 2019 the government initiated an independent review of Prevent which revealed that several individuals involved in terrorist activities had been referred to Prevent prior to their offences but

[111] HM Government (2015) Prevent Duty Guidance, London, [www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/978011133309/pdfs/ukdsiod\\_978011133309\\_en.pdf](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/978011133309/pdfs/ukdsiod_978011133309_en.pdf), paragraph 5.

[112] Elliot, I.A., Randhawa-Horne, K. and Hambly, O. (2023) The Extremism Risk Guidance 22+: An Exploratory Psychometric Analysis, London: Ministry of Justice, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/641c2b8f32a8e000cfa9288/extremism-risk-guidance-22+.pdf>, 39.

[113] Lloyd, M. and Dean, C. (2015) 'The Development of the ERG 22+ Structured Professional Guidelines for Assessing Risk of Extremist Offending', *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management* 2(1): 40–52.

[114] HM Government (2015) 'Revised Prevent duty guidance: For England and Wales (2015)', [www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance-england-scotland-and-wales-2015/revised-prevent-duty-guidance-for-england-and-wales-2015](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance-england-scotland-and-wales-2015/revised-prevent-duty-guidance-for-england-and-wales-2015).

[115] Aked, H. (2020) False Positives: The Prevent Counter-Extremism Policy in Healthcare, London: Medact, [www.medact.org/2020/resources/reports/false-positives-the-prevent-counter-extremism-policy-in-healthcare](http://www.medact.org/2020/resources/reports/false-positives-the-prevent-counter-extremism-policy-in-healthcare).

were not prevented from carrying them out. [116]

Each year, the Home Office publishes statistics on around 7,000 Prevent referrals, which are touted as evidence of its success. [117] However, currently only 13 per cent of these referrals are deemed suitable for the Channel deradicalisation programme; historically, this figure has been as low as 5 per cent. Even among the cases that proceed to Channel, there is no evidence that the individuals involved would have committed any future offences. The independent reviewer of Prevent criticised the programme for insufficient focus on Islamist extremism, despite a higher proportion of referrals deemed suitable for Channel being far-right-related. These discrepancies highlight the lack of evidence behind claims of the efficacy or success of Prevent.

This chapter unpacks how Prevent not only targets Muslim communities disproportionately, making it inherently Islamophobic, but also perpetuates Islamophobia by normalising suspicion toward Muslims across institutions. The fluid definitions of extremism allow for vague and biased interpretations, leading educators, healthcare workers and the public to associate Muslim identity with potential threats. This creates a cycle where Islamophobic assumptions are reinforced and institutionalised, shaping broader societal attitudes and further entrenching discriminatory practices.

Since 2015, the Home Office's own Prevent statistics have revealed a persistent focus on Muslims despite evolving Prevent guidance and definitions of extremism. In 2015/16, Muslims were referred to Prevent 125 times more frequently than non-Muslims, [118] although this decreased to 72 times in 2016/17 [119] and 46 times in 2017/18. [120] As of the last published data in 2022/23, Muslims

[116] HM Government (2021) *The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill: Independent Review of Prevent Fact-sheet*, London, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6022711fe90e0711c8c3d4c5/cts-bil-fact-sheet-independent-review-prevent-jan-2021.pdf>; HM Government (2023) 'Independent review of Prevent', 20 February, [www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-prevents-report-and-government-response/independent-review-of-prevent-accessible](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-prevents-report-and-government-response/independent-review-of-prevent-accessible).

[117] Home Office (2023) 'Individuals referred to and supported by the Prevent programme, April 2021 to March 2022', 26 January, [www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2021-to-march-2022/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2021-to-march-2022](http://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2021-to-march-2022/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2021-to-march-2022).

[118] Calculated using the annual Home Office statistics, adjusting for the UK Muslim population of 5 per cent and assuming all Islamist extremism referrals are Muslim and all far-right extremism referrals are non-Muslim; Home Office (2017) 'Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, 2015 to 2016', *Statistical Bulletin* 23/17, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a81ea1540f0b62302699d88/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2015-mar2016.pdf>.

[119] Home Office (2018) 'Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, 2016 to 2017', *Statistical Bulletin* 06/18, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5ab5250ced915d78b9a45bod/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2016-mar2017.pdf>.

[120] Home Office (2019) 'Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, 2017 to 2018', *Statistical Bulletin* 31/18, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c0e9aa540f0b60bb17f6ddc/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2017-mar2018-hosb3118.pdf>.

KEEPING THE DEFINITION OF EXTREMISM AMBIGUOUS APPEARS TO BE A STRATEGIC MOVE, ALLOWING THE STANDARDS FOR WHAT IS CONSIDERED EXTREME TO EVOLVE WITH POLITICAL CHANGES.

... HOW CAN WE DISMANTLE POLICIES PERPETUATING INSTITUTIONALISED ISLAMOPHOBIA IF THIS PREJUDICE REMAINS UNDEFINED AND UNACKNOWLEDGED?

Layla Aitlhadj

were still being referred to Prevent ten times more frequently than non-Muslims. [121] It is the statutory nature of Prevent, mandated by law, that institutionalises this discrimination as a form of state-sanctioned Islamophobia. Notably, a third of Prevent referrals are of individuals under 14 years old and thus state-sanctioned Islamophobia is being felt most by children. [122] These findings were echoed recently by a UN committee, which raised concerns about the Prevent duty creating ‘an atmosphere of suspicion towards members of Muslim communities’. [123] The committee called for the suspension of the Prevent duty, alongside reparations for individuals harmed.



voluntarily engage with Prevent officers led them to contact the child’s school. Initially, the staff reported no concerns, but 24 hours later a teacher submitted an observation noting that the child had learned a special Arabic prayer and stated that Allah ‘created everything, including snow’.

The officers then referred the child to Prevent, prompting Children’s Services to get involved. Prevent officers tried to approach the family once again, together with Children’s Services. This is not the first time we have documented such tactics, where the intervention of Children’s Services is used as a coercive measure by Prevent; in this case, since the father did not wish to engage, the pressure of the impact on the child and the involvement of Children’s Services was used as a way to coax him into doing so.

What is often obscured by the sanitised language of Prevent, such as ‘safeguarding’ and ‘support’, is that despite Prevent and subsequent Channel intervention being voluntary, it is fundamentally a counter-terrorism initiative. Led by counter-terrorism units within the police, Prevent inevitably suffers from the same racist and anti-Muslim undercurrents as the rest of the police force. [124]

In my role as caseworker at Prevent Watch, an NGO that supports individuals impacted by Prevent, I encountered a four-year-old Muslim boy whose father became ‘of interest’ to the police due to his ‘da’wa’ (proselytising, or calling people to Islam). Although the father had committed no crime, his refusal to

[121] Home Office, ‘Individuals referred to and supported by the Prevent programme, April 2021 to March 2022’.

[122] Home Office, ‘Individuals referred to and supported by the Prevent programme, April 2022 to March 2023’.

[123] Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (2024) ‘Concluding observations on the combined twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth periodic reports of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 23 August, [https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FGBR%2FCO%2F24-26&Lang=en](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FGBR%2FCO%2F24-26&Lang=en).

[124] Baroness Casey Review (2023) Final Report: An Independent Review into the Standards of Behaviour and Internal Culture of the Metropolitan Police Service, March, [www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/media/downloads/met/about-us/baroness-casey-review/update-march-2023/baroness-casey-review-march-2023a.pdf](http://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/media/downloads/met/about-us/baroness-casey-review/update-march-2023/baroness-casey-review-march-2023a.pdf); Runnymede Trust (2023) Over-Policed and Under-Protected: The Road to Safer Schools, London, [www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/over-policed-and-under-protected-the-road-to-safer-schools](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/over-policed-and-under-protected-the-road-to-safer-schools).

[125] Aitlhadj, L. and Holmwood, J. (2022) The People’s Review of Prevent, <https://peoplesreviewofprevent.org/prop-report>.

Islamophobia and anti-religious bias occurred at every stage of this case: first, when the police saw the father’s religious outreach as a security concern; second, when school staff reinterpreted the child’s innocent behaviours as potential ‘signs of radicalisation’; and third, when the Prevent referral was made, reiterating and institutionalising that bias and suspicion around expressions of religious belief and behaviours, even when demonstrated by a child.

Front-line public sector workers are compelled to implement Prevent as a distinct duty and as part of other policies such as those around safeguarding. For instance, in schools, the ability to spot signs of radicalisation is linked to Ofsted safeguarding assessments and school rankings, thereby creating an incentive for schools to enforce Prevent. An example case documented by Prevent Watch, detailed in the People’s Review of Prevent [125] and reported in the media, [126] is that of a four-year-old Muslim child referred to Prevent following references to the popular online game Fortnite which included the terms ‘guns’ and ‘bombs’. The educator neither clarified the child’s comment nor spoke to the parent, who collected the child that evening. Instead, a Prevent referral was made, leading to the child being visited at home by a police officer that evening. The child’s mother believed that her son would not have been referred if he were not a brown Muslim boy.

[126] Stein, J. and Townsend, M. (2021) ‘Muslim boy, 4, was referred to Prevent over game of Fortnite’, Guardian, 31 January, [www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/January/31/muslim-boy-4-was-referred-to-prevent-over-game-of-fortnite#:~:text=The%20boy%2C%20who%20is%20from,weaponry%20was%20linked%20to%20Fortnite](http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/January/31/muslim-boy-4-was-referred-to-prevent-over-game-of-fortnite#:~:text=The%20boy%2C%20who%20is%20from,weaponry%20was%20linked%20to%20Fortnite).

[127] ACT Early (no date) ‘Prevent radicalisation and extremism by acting early’, <https://actearly.uk>.

[128] Redcar and Cleveland Council (no date) ‘What is Prevent’, [www.redcar-cleveland.gov.uk/community-safety/prevent/what-is-prevent](http://www.redcar-cleveland.gov.uk/community-safety/prevent/what-is-prevent).

When the parent complained, the school responded that it was not their job to verify any information, only to report it. Prevent referrals are actively encouraged by the police and government, often without rigorous checks on the actual concern. For example, the ACT Early website advises: ‘Act early and tell us your concerns in confidence. You won’t be wasting our time and you won’t ruin lives, but you may save them.’ [127] Similarly, Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council’s guidance suggests: ‘It’s better to be safe than sorry. If you suspect it, report it.’ [128] The Metropolitan Police urges people to ‘trust your instincts’ and promises that ‘You won’t be wasting our time’. [129] These examples highlight how Prevent referrals are driven by a focus on instincts and suspicion rather than verified evidence.

Cases such as those described above demonstrate how institutional processes ingrained within Prevent have normalised referring individuals for signs of extremism, as if there is an unprecedented level of threat. This pressure is tangible for those implementing the duty. Indeed, several nurseries and schools have been downgraded by Ofsted due to inadequate Prevent implementation. [130] Such measures are likely to intensify with the latest recommendation for a Standards and Compliance Unit (Stacu), adding another layer of scrutiny for institutions falling short of their Prevent duties. [131]

[129] Metropolitan Police (no date) ‘Prevent’, [www.met.police.uk/advice/advice-and-information/t/prevent/prevent/#:~:text=You're%20best%20placed%20to,from%20being%20groomed%20and%20radicalised](http://www.met.police.uk/advice/advice-and-information/t/prevent/prevent/#:~:text=You're%20best%20placed%20to,from%20being%20groomed%20and%20radicalised).

[130] Busby, E. (2018) ‘Nursery downgraded for failing to spot toddlers are at risk of extremism’, Independent, 10 July, [www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/little-ducklings-nursery-prevent-extremism-preschool-ofsted-inspection-hove-a8474266.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/little-ducklings-nursery-prevent-extremism-preschool-ofsted-inspection-hove-a8474266.html).

[131] Commission for Countering Extremism (2024) ‘Standards and Compliance Unit launched to oversee Prevent’, 28 February, [www.gov.uk/government/news/standards-and-compliance-unit-launched-to-oversee-prevent](http://www.gov.uk/government/news/standards-and-compliance-unit-launched-to-oversee-prevent).

Although the list of ‘extremism risk factors’ has remained the same since it was developed in 2011, the idea of who is deemed an extremist has expanded to include a wide range of individuals and organisations that express non-violent dissent. The determination of extremism is often influenced by prevailing narratives rather than safety concerns. Notably, even in the independent review of Prevent, the recommendations continue to focus overwhelmingly on Islamist extremism while neglecting other forms of threat such as white supremacy. This reflects a selective security narrative that overlooks the broader spectrum of dangers in society.

By focusing on political rather security-driven agendas, this approach has raised concerns about the suppression of legitimate political and social critique. The conflation of extremism with terrorism can lead to real-life consequences, such as stigmatisation and unjust treatment of individuals expressing dissenting views. This has been highlighted during the pro-Palestine demonstrations and activism as a result of the most recent Israeli strikes on Gaza.

Against a backdrop of political rhetoric, including comments by then-home secretary Suella Braverman labelling marches demanding a ceasefire ‘hate marches’ [132] and by then-secretary of state for levelling up, housing and communities Michael Gove associating a longstanding phrase of the Palestinian freedom movement – ‘from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free’ – with extremism, [133] there were also letters to schools from the education secretary and police forces conflating terrorism with legitimate political discussion and freedom of speech while encouraging the implementation of Prevent duty. [134] Consequently, there was a spike in Prevent referrals as well as arrests for terrorism-related offences.[135]

In one case, a mature university student was visited at home by two police officers who claimed that her tweet ‘from the river to the sea, Palestine will be free’ could be construed as antisemitic and suggested that she might be vulnerable to radicalisation. [136] The officers recommended a Prevent referral, using terms like ‘extremism’, ‘radicalisation’ and ‘terrorism’ interchangeably with ‘antisemitism’, despite being unable to clarify any legal breach. Based on evidence sent to

Prevent Watch by the student, one officer admitted feeling silly as it was clear she was not a terrorist and he had never done this before, but he still encouraged her to complete the Prevent referral form with him. The student refused but later discovered that this incident was part of a broader pattern of data-sharing between her university and the police due to her activism around Palestine and anti-monarchy protests. [137]

Keeping the definition of extremism ambiguous appears to be a strategic move, allowing the standards for what is considered extreme to evolve with political changes. This ambiguity introduces subjectivity into the identification of extremism, enables the expansion of criteria without safeguards and complicates legal challenges as individuals struggle to contest vague accusations. The reluctance to legally define extremism, combined with the disproportionate targeting of Muslims by Prevent, mirrors the UK government’s hesitance to adopt a comprehensive definition of Islamophobia.

This raises a critical question:

**How can we dismantle policies perpetuating institutionalised Islamophobia if this prejudice remains undefined and unacknowledged?**

**This issue goes beyond isolated incidents of prejudice, reflecting a systemic problem embedded in policies that stigmatise Muslims. For those severely affected by Prevent, addressing systemic Islamophobia necessitates abolishing Prevent. Many believe that this is where meaningful change must begin.**



[132] Syal, R. Sabbagh, D. and Stacey, K. (2023) ‘Suella Braverman calls pro-Palestine demos “hate marches”’, Guardian, 30 October, [www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/October/30/uk-ministers-cobra-meeting-terrorism-threat-israel-hamas-conflict-suella-braverman](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/October/30/uk-ministers-cobra-meeting-terrorism-threat-israel-hamas-conflict-suella-braverman).

[133] Sky News (2024) ‘Michael Gove says “good-hearted people” at pro-Palestine marches should question potential “extremist organisers”’, 10 March, <https://news.sky.com/story/michael-gove-says-good-hearted-people-attending-pro-palestine-marches-should-question-potential-extremist-organisers-13091567>.


[134] UK Government (2023) ‘Message on the Israel Hamas conflict from the Education Secretary Gillian Keegan, the Minister for Schools Nick Gibb and the Minister for Skills, Apprenticeships and Higher Education Robert Halfon’, 17 October, <https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/UKDFE/bulletins/3763f13>.

[135] Bentham, M. (2023) ‘Gaza attacks raise risk of terror attacks in London, says MET terrorism chief’, Evening Standard, 29 November, [www.standard.co.uk/news/london/met-police-terror-warning-radicalisation-war-gaza-b1123439.html](http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/met-police-terror-warning-radicalisation-war-gaza-b1123439.html).

[136] Brown, R. (2023) ‘A student was referred to Prevent for tweeting “from the river to the sea”’, Novara Media, 4 December, <https://novaramedia.com/2023/12/04/a-student-was-referred-to-prevent-for-tweeting-from-the-river-to-the-sea>.

[137] Walawalkar, A., Clugston, H. and Milton, J. (2024) ‘Universities accused of “spying” on student protestors for police’, Metro, 2 July, <https://metro.co.uk/2024/07/02/universities-accused-spying-student-gaza-protesters-police-21142804>.

# POLICING SOLIDARITIES AND ISLAMOPHOBIA



## Shereen Fernandez and Waqas Tufail

Dr Shereen Fernandez is an academic at LSE. Her work looks at global Islamophobia, surveillance, technology and the War on Terror.

Dr Waqas Tufail is a reader in criminology at Leeds Beckett University. His work focuses on Islamophobia, media representations of Muslims, and the societal impact of racialised moral panics on criminal justice and social policy and the implications this has for anti-racism.

This last year has revealed the promises and limitations of solidarity. [138] The relentless onslaught of violence which many regard as executing the eradication of Palestinians in Gaza [139] has captured our attention, each image as horrifying as the last. An article published in *The Lancet* estimated that there had been 37,396 deaths from the beginning of the Israeli offensive in October 2023 to 19 June 2024, while cautioning that counting the number of fatalities is an extraordinarily difficult challenge.

[140] The atrocities carried out in Gaza have led to worldwide displays of solidarity for Palestinians and Palestine, among which have been student-led movements. Encampments have been set up across universities in the UK, the US and elsewhere, with students calling for universities to divest from arms companies and back a permanent ceasefire. And yet many of those protesting this vicious violence have been met with extraordinarily aggressive policing,

sometimes with long-lasting consequences such as the termination of employment and the revoking of degrees. In April 2024, for example, students and staff at Columbia University were brutally assaulted by law enforcement officers who had been called in by the university administration – a move which has been replicated across the ocean in UK universities, with legal challenges also sought to evict students from encampments. Police brutality targeting pro-Palestine student encampments has been documented at numerous UK universities, with reports of individuals being dragged by their hair and arms and being assaulted with batons. [141]

Among this murkiness has been a brazen Islamophobia, one which is reminiscent of the ways that Muslims and Arabs were (and continue to be) targeted and securitised

[138] This chapter is reproduced from Fernandez, S. and Tufail, W. (2023) 'Palestine, Islamophobia and the policing of solidarity', *Identities* blog, 14 December, [www.identitiesjournal.com/blog-collection/palestine-islamophobia-and-the-policing-of-solidarity](http://www.identitiesjournal.com/blog-collection/palestine-islamophobia-and-the-policing-of-solidarity).

[139] UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2023) 'Israel working to expel civilian population of Gaza, UN expert warns', 22 December, [www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/12/israel-working-expel-civilian-population-gaza-un-expert-warns](http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/12/israel-working-expel-civilian-population-gaza-un-expert-warns).

[140] Khatib, R., McKee, M. and Yusuf, S. (2024) 'Counting the dead in Gaza: Difficult but essential', *Lancet*, correspondence, 5 July, [www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2824%2901169-3](http://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2824%2901169-3).

[141] Awan, I. and Zempi, I. (2020) *Non-Muslim Men Who Suffer Islamophobia: A Briefing Paper*, Geneva: OHCHR, [www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Islamophobia-AntiMuslim/Civil%20Society%20or%20Individuals/ProfAwan-4.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Islamophobia-AntiMuslim/Civil%20Society%20or%20Individuals/ProfAwan-4.pdf); Mirza, M. (2024) 'War on Gaza: Why are UK universities inviting police to curb student protests?' *Middle East Eye*, 29 June, [www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/gaza-war-uk-universities-police-crack-down-protesters-why](http://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/gaza-war-uk-universities-police-crack-down-protesters-why).

during the ‘War on Terror’. [142] The rampant use of counter-terrorism legislation, a key driver of Islamophobia, can be traced to the beginnings of the War on Terror, instituted in 2001 by the US and enthusiastically backed by the UK and other Western governments. The War on Terror set in motion an array of new ‘anti-terrorism’ measures and powers with the supposed aim of preventing extremism and radicalisation. The power to legislate and designate groups as terrorists has historical precedence, with colonial administrations often doing so to quash revolutions and hinder any attempt at resistance. [143] As these powers have been intensified, they have led to numerous human rights abuses in the form of over-policing, abuse of police power, entrapment, racial profiling and community surveillance. [144]

We see Islamophobia as a form of racism which is both structural and institutional in its reach and its implications. From Muslims experiencing large-scale travel bans [145] to Muslim students being targeted by counter-extremism measures in educational institutions for their normative Islamic beliefs and practices, [146] we are seeing the

The power to legislate and designate groups as terrorists has historical precedence, with colonial administrations often doing so to quash revolutions and hinder any attempt at resistance.

increasing ways in which expressions of Muslimness have been policed. Indeed, the perception of Muslimness is a necessary condition for Islamophobia, as evidenced in the murder of Balbir Singh Sodhi, a Sikh man mistakenly believed to be Muslim, in Arizona days after 9/11. Research in the UK has documented the often violent experiences of non-Muslims encountering Islamophobia. [147] The brutality of Islamophobia is global in its reach too, from the Chapel Hill shootings of 2015, [148] which cost the lives of Deah Shaddy Barakat and Yusor and Razan Mohammad Abu-Salha, to the lynching of Indian Muslims under the current Modi regime. [149]

[142] The ‘War on Terror’ refers to the US-led ‘counter terror’ strategy initiated in 2001 following the 9/11 attacks. It is associated with widespread human rights abuses and the direct and indirect deaths of millions of people; see Watson Institute (no date) ‘Costs of war’, <https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures>.

[143] McQuade, J. (2020) *A Genealogy of Terrorism: Colonial Law and the Origins of an Idea*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

[144] Tufail, W. and Poynting, S. (2023) ‘Policing Muslims: Counter terrorism policing in the UK and Australia’, in Cunneen, C., Deckert, A., Porter, A., Tauri, J and Webb, R. (eds) *The Routledge International Handbook on Decolonizing Justice*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

[145] Amnesty International (2020) ‘A licence to discriminate: Trump’s Muslim and refugee ban’, 6 October, [www.amnesty.org.uk/licence-discriminate-trumps-muslim-refugee-ban](http://www.amnesty.org.uk/licence-discriminate-trumps-muslim-refugee-ban).


[146] Rights and Security International (no date) *Rights and Security International’s Submissions for the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief’s Report on Anti-Muslim Hatred and Discrimination*, OHCHR, [www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Islamophobia-AntiMuslim/Civil%20Society%20or%20Individuals/RightsandSecurityInternational.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Islamophobia-AntiMuslim/Civil%20Society%20or%20Individuals/RightsandSecurityInternational.pdf).

[147] Sian, K. (2017) ‘Surveillance, Islamophobia, and Sikh bodies in the War on Terror’, *Islamophobia Studies Journal* 4(1): 37–52.

[148] Chappell, B. (2019) ‘N.C. man pleads guilty to killing 3 Muslim college students: Video is played in court’, NPR, 12 June, [www.npr.org/2019/06/12/731981858/n-c-man-pleads-guilty-to-murdering-3-muslim-college-students](http://www.npr.org/2019/06/12/731981858/n-c-man-pleads-guilty-to-murdering-3-muslim-college-students).


[149] Zargar, H. (2024) ‘India: Why Muslim lynchings continue unabated in Modi’s third term’, *Middle East Eye*, 12 August, [www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/india-modi-third-time-muslim-lynchings-continue-unabated-why](http://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/india-modi-third-time-muslim-lynchings-continue-unabated-why).

THE PAST YEAR HAS LAID BARE THE HYPOCRISY OF THE VALUES THAT THE WEST ENJOYS ASSOCIATING ITSELF WITH



WAR ON TERROR  
WAR OF TERROR

Shereen Fernandez and Waqas Tufail



Most recently, the UK elections of 2024 saw key politicians in the Labour and Conservative parties across the country unseated as a result of economic and social frustrations as well as remarks made about Israel's right to defend itself by any means necessary. [150] Muslim and pro-Palestine constituents organised together in an impressive display of local democratic politics to hold politicians to account for their silence or complicity in refusing to call for a ceasefire in Gaza. These shocking defeats and the rise of independent politicians has been labelled by many pundits the consequence of the 'Muslim vote', with Muslims labelled agitators desperate to disrupt democracy. [151] The campaign for more independent candidates, featuring Muslim and non-

Muslim pro-Palestine campaigners, grew out of a deep frustration with Britain's lack of response to – or even presumed support for – Israel's ongoing violence. The campaign was governed by a form of solidarity politics for Gaza, with independent MP Jeremy Corbyn announcing that 'Palestine was on the ballot' before his victory. This swing towards support for Gaza and the rise of independent MPs was of great concern for right-wing journalists in particular, with some branding it 'horrifying' and others eagerly trying to frame these wins as part of a 'Muslim problem'. [152] The narrative of 'extremism' being used as a way to describe the urgency of tackling 'pro-Palestine activists' dominated the electoral debates. As we have seen with the War on Terror, framing concerns around extremist

[150] Francis, S. (2024) 'Labour lost Muslim voters' trust over Gaza, says MP Shabana Mahmood', BBC News, 9 February, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-68244592](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-68244592).

[151] Elshayyal, K. (2024) 'UN elections 2024: Why British Muslim voters can no longer be ignored', Middle East Eye, 10 July, [www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/uk-elections-2024-british-muslim-voters-ignored-no-longer-why](http://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/uk-elections-2024-british-muslim-voters-ignored-no-longer-why).

[152] Simons, J.W. (2024) 'Why the Muslim Vote campaign is a glimpse into a horrifying future', Telegraph, 7 July, [www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2024/07/07/the-muslim-vote-sectarian-insurgency-gaza-shocked-britain](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2024/07/07/the-muslim-vote-sectarian-insurgency-gaza-shocked-britain).

behaviours leads to intensified surveillance, racial profiling and criminalisation, particularly of Muslims. A recent review into political violence by former Labour MP John Woodcock, for example, views the solidarity protests for Palestine in the UK as 'anti-Israel marches' which breed antisemitism and the glorification of terrorism. [153] The designation of pro-Palestinian marches as hateful and as fuelling extremism plays into an oft-repeated trope which categorises 'Muslim' concerns as something that should be monitored and suppressed.

By understanding it as a form of systemic racism, we seek to go beyond facile claims that understand Islamophobia only as 'hate crime' [154] – one of the many ways in which it is both minimised and denied. This overt securitisation does not begin or end at the protest site itself, but it certainly contributes to the War on Terror narrative which sees any divergence from the status quo as a threat. In one such case, Marieha Hussain was charged with a racially aggravated public offence order for carrying a placard depicting Rishi Sunak and Suella Braverman as coconuts. [155] The policing of such free expression is not only chilling in its own right but highlights the limitations of those

[153] Harris, T. (2024) 'The time is right to clamp down on anti-democratic protests', Telegraph, 22 May, [www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/05/22/time-right-to-clamp-down-on-protests](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/05/22/time-right-to-clamp-down-on-protests).

[154] Tufail, W. and Poynting, S. (2023) 'Policing Muslims: Counter-terrorism and Islamophobia in the UK and Australia', in Cunnen, C., Deckert, A., Porter, A., Tauri, J. and Webb, R. (eds) *The Routledge International Handbook on Decolonizing Justice*, London: Routledge.

[155] Salisbury, J. (2023) 'Teacher wanted by police after carrying placard showing Sunak and Braverman as coconuts at pro-Palestine march', Standard, 14 November, [www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/met-police-coconuts-poster-rishi-sunak-suella-braverman-pro-palestine-march-b1120176.html](http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/met-police-coconuts-poster-rishi-sunak-suella-braverman-pro-palestine-march-b1120176.html).

who call for more laws, more policing and more criminalisation to tackle 'hate crime'. In other words, the liberal tendency to call for greater punishment ostensibly for the protection of racialised minorities has in fact led to the intensified policing of racialised minorities. The overwhelming presence of police at recent pro-Palestine marches and their overzealous use of social media to publicly appeal for information on those they wanted to speak to, whether for clothes they were wearing, slogans they were chanting or placards they were holding up, also confirms how securitised Muslims and the Palestinian cause are. The policing of the recent and ongoing pro-Palestine demonstrations has seen action and arrests take place for slogans and placards, including footage of police rifling through the literature of a stall of a political group and subsequently arresting an NHS doctor. [156] The Metropolitan Police took the unprecedented step of handing out leaflets at a recent London demonstration for Palestine, warning attendees that their slogans and placards would be monitored for potential violations of the law. [157] The contrast with the treatment of those who routinely issue genocidal statements such as calling for Gaza to be flattened could not be clearer. [158]

[156] Al Mayadeen (2023) 'UK police arrest British Dr Ranjeet Brar for criticizing Zionism', 26 November, <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/uk-police-arrest-british-dr-ranjeet-brar-for-criticizing-zi>.

[157] Stop the War Coalition (2023) 'Joint statement on the policing of the Palestine demonstrations', 29 November, [www.stopwar.org.uk/article/joint-statement-on-the-policing-of-the-palestine-demonstrations](http://www.stopwar.org.uk/article/joint-statement-on-the-policing-of-the-palestine-demonstrations).

[158] Zirin, D. (2023) 'The march for Israel was a hate rally', 15 November, [www.thenation.com/article/activism/march-israel-hate-rally-democrats](http://www.thenation.com/article/activism/march-israel-hate-rally-democrats).

In Britain, the selective use of counter-terror legislation against pro-Palestinian protestors and activists is part of a much wider trend of criminalising dissent. While most of these abuses have attracted little attention (in our view, due to prevailing racism and Islamophobia), even less attention has been paid to the effects that these developments have had on political dissent and other forms of political protest, particularly for Muslim individuals and communities. The UK and US security states have long associated pro-Palestinian protest with extremism and used it as a justification for surveillance and police harassment – numerous case studies over the past two decades have confirmed this approach. [159] The current widespread attacks on pro-Palestinian solidarity therefore have a wider historical context that needs to be considered: while this certainly escalated with the onset of the War on Terror, the repression has long roots which predate this period. Modern counter-terrorism, in both its ‘home’ and its ‘abroad’ iterations, has been directly informed by the techniques honed during the colonial period by the empires of the twentieth century.

In myriad ways, the past year has laid bare the hypocrisy of the values that the West enjoys associating itself with – democracy, the rule of law and freedom of speech. For many (including the present authors), this hypocrisy was made clear through the

decades-long abuses of the War on Terror – a war that proved in fact to be a war of terror, [160] both at home and abroad. There is a constant repackaging of measures seeking to marginalise, criminalise and punish dissent, as seen historically via colonial laws and contemporarily with Prevent. The ongoing genocidal acts in Gaza [161] have (re)awakened our consciousness to push back against Islamophobic narratives that see expressions of freedom by Muslims and Arabs as dangerous. Equally, many are choosing to speak out against the constant calls to condemn, [162] experienced most frequently by Palestinians and Muslims and often used as a racialised qualifier to determine whether someone’s opinion and position should be accepted. A particularly illustrative example concerned Husam Zomlot, the Palestine ambassador to the UK who, during an interview with BBC Newsnight where he had just announced the killing of six of his family members in Gaza by Israel, was asked by the host if he condoned the killing of Israeli civilians. [163] The importance of the current political moment demonstrates that the political option of refusal [164] – of refusing to engage on the terms of the oppressor – must be sought if we are to avoid falling into stark binary depictions that seek to reinforce Islamophobia and securitisation while simultaneously marginalising expressions of solidarity with Palestinians.

[159] Amnesty International (2023) ‘This Is the Thought Police’: The Prevent Duty and Its Chilling Effect on Human Rights, London, [www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-11/Amnesty%20UK%20Prevent%20report%20%281%29.pdf?VersionId=.hjIwRZuHiGd1\\_IEXroFwg25jyBtwur](http://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-11/Amnesty%20UK%20Prevent%20report%20%281%29.pdf?VersionId=.hjIwRZuHiGd1_IEXroFwg25jyBtwur).

[160] Poynting, S. and Whyte, D. (eds) (2012) *Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The ‘War on Terror’ as Terror*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.


[161] Foulkes, I. (2024) ‘Gaza war: UN rights expert accuses Israel of acts of genocide’, BBC News, 26 March, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68667556](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68667556).

[162] Jamal, H. (2023) ‘Germany’s weaponisation of antisemitism to target migrants and Arabs is what must be condemned’, *The New Arab*, 1 December, [www.newarab.com/opinion/palestinian-germany-i-refuse-condemn](http://www.newarab.com/opinion/palestinian-germany-i-refuse-condemn).

[163] Yusuf, H. (2023) ‘Why do UK media insist Palestinians condemn Hamas but not that Israelis condemn Israel?’ *Declassified UK*, 4 November, [www.declassifieduk.org/why-do-uk-media-insist-palestinians-condemn-hamas-but-not-that-israelis-condemn-israel](http://www.declassifieduk.org/why-do-uk-media-insist-palestinians-condemn-hamas-but-not-that-israelis-condemn-israel).

[164] Fernandez, S. and Johnson, A. (2020) ‘Navigating refusal within the academy’, in Qureshi, A. (ed.) *I Refuse to Condemn*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

This chapter is an urgent testament to the increasing ways in which solidarity campaigns are policed and how they are tied to Islamophobic tropes that have ultimately been normalised in society. Whether through political demands for more police powers to stifle or prevent protest or through the framing of independent campaigners advocating for a ceasefire in Gaza as ‘extremists’, we are seeing the securitised logics of the War on Terror being extended to other causes.



By taking Islamophobia seriously as a form of structural racism, we see how detrimental its normalisation is in terms of the diminishing of our civil liberties, beginning and not ending with the constraints placed on our solidarity.



# GROWING ISLAMOPHOBIA AND MUSLIM MENTAL HEALTH:

## Current challenges and future movements

### Tarek Younis

Dr Tarek Younis is the racial justice researcher at Healing Justice London and a senior lecturer in psychology at Middlesex University. He teaches, writes and works as a clinical psychologist on issues related to Islamophobia, racism in mental health and the politics of psychology.

At an airport, counter-terrorism police stopped a Muslim adolescent for questioning. This was because of the Palestinian flag he wore.

*‘There are protests every single day in central London’, the officer told the adolescent. ‘Why in particular these protests?’*

As journalist Nandini Naira Archer notes, the adolescent was questioned about his knowledge of who was attending these protests, and his level of engagement with pro-Palestinian movements. Following the incident, the Muslim adolescent admitted:

*I’m still shaken ... I had a seizure because of the nightmares I had about the police coming onto the plane and arresting me. Every time, the nightmare would end with me getting shot in the head by an officer. [165]*

As a Muslim, to be interrogated by authorities – not only police but teachers, medical staff, etc. – for one’s political views is an acutely stressful experience. This violent procedure has been a mainstay for Muslims since the War on Terror began.

[165] Archer, N.N. (2024) ‘Counter-terror police use of Palestine protests to hone tactics revealed in airport recording’, openDemocracy, 17 January, [www.opendemocracy.net/en/counter-terror-police-palestine-protests-israel-gaza-airport-recording](http://www.opendemocracy.net/en/counter-terror-police-palestine-protests-israel-gaza-airport-recording).

[166] Bignall, T., Jeraj, S., Helsby, E. and Butt, J. (2019) *Racial Disparities in Mental Health: Literature and Evidence Review*, London: Race Equality Foundation; Nazroo, J., Bhui, K. and Rhodes, J. (2020) ‘Where next for understanding race/ethnic inequalities in severe mental illness? Structural, interpersonal and institutional racism’, *Sociology of Health & Illness* 42(2): 262–276.

Instead of focusing on discrimination as an individual experience, this chapter explores institutional forms of Islamophobia and the anxiety they cause. Additionally, I examine how mundane forms of Islamophobia operate and why this matters for Muslim mental health. I conclude by highlighting the significance of community-based organising for healing.

### Islamophobia and mental health: A critical summary

The process by which people of colour are racialised has mental health implications. [166] Certainly, this is significant for the Muslim community as well. [167] A recent systematic review of the literature on mental health and Islamophobia found that, overall, experiences of discrimination have implications for mental health, physical health and healthcare access. [168]

[167] Younis T (2023) *The Muslim, State and Mind*. London: Sage.

[168] Samari, G., Alcalá, H.E. and Sharif, M.Z. (2018) ‘Islamophobia, health, and public health: A systematic literature review’, *American Journal of Public Health* 108(6): e1–e9.

Yet, as Samari and colleagues note, research on Islamophobia and its impact on mental health is limited by its focus on interpersonal discrimination. This reflects the liberal commitment to anti-racism, whereby Islamophobia is constrained to clear instances of bigotry (i.e. direct instances of abuse or discrimination). Yet much of Islamophobia falls within liberal acceptability. Racist policies attempt to delineate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ Muslims. Within liberal discourse, the need to surveil and manage Muslims is a question of security and national cohesion, not racism. Indeed, UK police chiefs admitted that they cannot permit Islamophobia to be understood as a form of racism: that would render their national counter-terrorism strategy racist. [169] If Muslims are explicitly policed for their thoughts and behaviours, Islamophobia cannot be reduced only to matters of interpersonal discrimination.

The youth’s experience of police questioning described above is justified as necessary in this political climate. This case is not unique. Countries across the Global North have been managing Muslim attitudes and behaviours regarding Palestine since long before 7 October 2023. [170] In the UK, these racist practices are institutionalised in the forms of policies such as Prevent (described elsewhere in this report). This speaks volumes in making sense of the racist climate that Muslims navigate in expressing their political views.

---

[169] Dodd, V. (2019) ‘Police chiefs in row over definition of Islamophobia’, Guardian, 15 May, [www.theguardian.com/news/2019/may/15/police-chiefs-in-row-over-definition-of-islamophobia](http://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/may/15/police-chiefs-in-row-over-definition-of-islamophobia).

[170] Khalili, L. (2013) *Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

### Islamophobia as a political climate for understanding Muslim mental health

Our understanding of Islamophobia dictates our ability to validate its impact. If we remain within the liberal emphasis on bigotry and hate, we overlook the experience of the young man in the introduction. However, if we note that Islamophobia is dictated by political pressure for Muslims to speak and behave in certain ways – or face uncertain consequences – we begin to address experiences of political self-censorship and civic uncertainty. And as I’ve noted in my research, self-censorship is born of anxiety. [171] When Muslims censor their thoughts, it comes from an understanding of the unpredictability of how negatively (and at times violently) public institutions may respond. Because this phenomenon lacks a clear ‘wrongdoer’ as required in liberal understandings of racism, it is rarely understood or validated.

Self-censorship is not the only overlooked experience in discussions of Islamophobia and Muslim mental health. Nonetheless, it remains significant as an indicator of a racist political climate, as documented in research. Amnesty International UK gathered 4,685 responses in an online questionnaire, exploring the ‘chilling effect’ (i.e. self-censorship) of the Prevent policy. [172] Its survey found that 467 individuals (10 per cent of the respondents) had changed their behaviours for fear of being referred to

---

[171] Younis, T. and Jadhav, S. (2019) ‘Keeping our mouths shut: The fear and racialized self-censorship of British healthcare professionals in Prevent training’, *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry* 43(3): 404–424.

[172] Amnesty International (2023) ‘This Is the Thought Police: The Prevent Duty and Its Chilling Effect on Human Rights’, London, [https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-11/Amnesty%20UK%20Prevent%20report%20\(1\).pdf](https://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-11/Amnesty%20UK%20Prevent%20report%20(1).pdf)

MENTAL HEALTH CARE  
HAS AN IMPULSE TO  
PSYCHOLOGISE THE  
CONSEQUENCES OF DEEPLY  
STRUCTURAL ISSUES -

POVERTY

WAR

COLONISATION

CLIMATE CHANGE

IT THEREBY  
INDIVIDUALISES  
ISSUES WHICH REQUIRE  
DRASTIC SOCIAL AND  
POLITICAL CHANGE.

Tarek Younis

Prevent. Of this number, almost half (46 per cent) identified as Muslim. Significantly, most Muslims (109 of the 153 respondents to this question) had modified their behaviour to avoid being seen as ‘extreme’, including by displaying support for protests and activism. Similarly, a National Union for Students survey in 2018 found that a third of Muslim students felt negatively impacted by the Prevent policy. [173]

The anxiety-inducing impact of the Prevent policy has also been underscored in healthcare. I have noted in my interviews with Muslim mental health professionals a similar tendency towards self-censorship born of anxiety (‘You don’t feel safe, you don’t feel safe, you don’t feel like your colleagues won’t report you’ [174]). The anxiety related to a climate of Islamophobia is not exclusive to the Prevent policy. A survey published by the British Islamic Medical Association found that half of Muslim women surveyed had experienced problems with wearing a headscarf in theatre (51.5 per cent), with some feeling embarrassed (23.4 per cent), anxious (37.1 per cent) and even bullied (36.5 per cent). [175]

The future of Islamophobia in mental health settings does not look promising. Recent research by Heath-Kelly (2024) found that psychologists and psychiatrists are now

being hired by the police in an unprecedented marriage between policing and the NHS. [176] These professionals are giving ad hoc clinical formulations to Prevent referrals – the vast majority of whom are Muslims who have never committed a crime [177]– without ever meeting the person in question. Then mental health ‘tripwires’ can be set up in the NHS. Thus, should the individual ever stop their NHS therapy, the police will be alerted – without the patient’s knowledge. Such developments have incredible significance for the ethics of the profession, but equally for discussions of Islamophobia in mental health. This is psychology at the behest of statecraft, a racist counter-extremism strategy explicitly integrating mental health assessments into its political programme.

### The politics of psychology: justice and health

Considering these developments, Muslim mental health faces a unique challenge moving forward. Mental health discourse has the capacity to depoliticise in two regards. First, an emphasis on mental health has a powerful impulse in individualising – and potentially pathologising – societal and political issues. For example, Muslims experience a ‘Muslim penalty’ on the job market when applying for work. [178] Consider

[173] Hassan, A. (2021) ‘Government policy is feeding campus Islamophobia’, *Tribune Magazine*, 25 November, <https://tribunemag.co.uk/2021/11/islamophobia-awareness-month-students-prevent-securitisation-state-surveillance>.

[174] Younis and Jadhav, ‘Keeping our mouths shut’.

[175] Yaqoob, Z., Qureshi, H., Malik, A. and Latif, A. (2019) ‘Career choices for Muslim women in the NHS: Hindered by dress code?’ *Journal of the British Islamic Medical Association* 2(1).

[176] Heath-Kelly, C. (2024) *Unhealthy Liaisons: NHS Collaboration with the Counter Terrorism Clinical Consultancy Service*, London: Medact, <https://stat.medact.org/wp-uploads/2024/07/Unhealthy-Liaisons-WEB-final-2.pdf>.

[177] Aitlhadj, L. and Holmwood, J. (2022) *The People’s Review of Prevent*, <https://peoplesreviewofprevent.org/prop-report>.

[178] Heath, A. and Mustafa, A. (2017) ‘Poverty and the labour market’, in Elahi, F. and Khan, O. (eds) *Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us All*, London: Runnymede Trust, [www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-still-a-challenge-for-us-all](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-still-a-challenge-for-us-all).

UK POLICE CHIEFS  
A D M I T T E D  
THAT THEY  
CANNOT PERMIT  
ISLAMOPHOBIA TO  
BE UNDERSTOOD AS  
A FORM OF RACISM:  
THAT WOULD  
RENDER THEIR  
NATIONAL COUNTER-  
T E R R O R I S M  
STRATEGY  
RACIST.

a Muslim who experiences anxiety related to their inability to find a job. While structures are in place to support them in their experience of anxiety, they are less likely to find support structures which recognise the racist foundation of their experience. [179]

Second, mental health responses have a powerful tendency to give the impression that something is ‘being done’ to support Muslims. A trauma response strategy is often provided for Muslim communities following white supremacist attacks. [180] Yet the political rhetoric encouraging the attack – i.e. the presentation of Muslim immigration as the ‘death’ of Euro-America that can be found in mainstream political discourse – remains unaddressed.

And it is not only a question of direct attacks on Muslims. Grenfell Tower was only one of many high-rises containing flammable cladding due to building deregulation. This is a racist occurrence, not a random one: Black and brown children comprise the largest proportion of inhabitants who live above the fourth floor in high-rises. [181] When the Grenfell Tower inevitably burned – despite its people having protested about the flammable material encapsulating their homes – the UK government provided one of the largest mental health responses in European history. [182] Yet this response conceals a painful reality: accountability and justice for the victims of the Grenfell fire remains thwarted to this day. Mental health cannot bandage the violence of structural racism. Rather, its causes must be understood and resisted.

## No health without resistance and liberation

The future of Muslim mental health, in times of rampant Islamophobia, depends on resisting the impulse to individualise a remedy. Institutional racist policies cannot be counteracted with increased cultural or religious sensitivity training of staff. Nor can Islamophobia be counteracted with increased representation in mental health settings.

To address this, we see positive developments in support systems despite worsening conditions for Muslims and their civil liberties in the UK. Organisations such as CAGE and HHUGS (Helping Households Under Great Stress) provide immense individual and communal relief to those impacted by liberal forms of state violence. They make Muslims feel validated and worthy of dignity despite the dehumanisation of the War on Terror. As such, their work is essential to healing.

Furthermore, there are movements that increasingly understand the Islamophobic policies undergirding public healthcare and respond with alternative healthcare structures. The Coming Home Project run by Maslaha supports Muslims impacted by policing, prisons and the criminal justice system. Coming Home takes seriously the endemic racism associated with prisons and policing and provides a free therapeutic

service that is explicitly and necessarily de-securitised. Healing Justice London is another organisation that works towards the development of transformative, de-securitised healthcare structures. Its support spaces for marginalised populations – including those impacted by the genocide of Palestinians [183] – have been exemplary in this regard.

All of these named organisations are affirmative examples of community-based, grassroots mobilisations. Rather than satisfy liberal sensibilities by focusing on overt racist discrimination, they exemplify sincere attempts at recognising the political process which drives marginalisation. This is necessary for Muslim mental health.

But more research is needed. Within public mental health settings, there are worrying instances of mental health professionals being disciplined for showing solidarity with Palestine. There are known cases of mental health professionals being disciplined and reprimanded for sharing their pro-Palestinian solidarity. [184] What does the genocide in Palestine reveal to us about racism in British mental health? We have yet to unpack this question.

## Conclusion

**Mental health care has an impulse to psychologise the consequences of deeply structural issues – poverty, war, colonisation and climate change. It thereby individualises issues which require drastic social and political change. This process can serve to uphold Islamophobia – not to counter it. If the mental health of Muslims is to be taken seriously, it cannot be disassociated from wider systems of justice and accountability for all.**

[179] For further discussion on this, see Younis, *The Muslim*.



[180] Younis, *The Muslim*.

[181] Dorling, D. (2011) *So You Think You Know About Britain?* London: Constable.

[182] Press Association (2017) ‘Grenfell Tower mental health response “largest of its kind in Europe”’, *Guardian*, 30 October, [www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/October/30/grenfell-tower-mental-health-response-largest-of-its-kind-in-europe](http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/October/30/grenfell-tower-mental-health-response-largest-of-its-kind-in-europe).

[183] Healing Justice LDN (2024) ‘Rehearsing Freedoms Festival’, <https://healingjusticeldn.org/2024/01/23/rehearsing-freedoms-festival>.

[184] For one of the only discussions on this issue in mental health settings in the Global North, see Berger, E. and Jabr, S. (2020) ‘Silencing Palestine: Limitations on free speech within mental health organizations’, *International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies* 17(2): 193–207.



## Bibliography

ACT Early (no date) 'Prevent radicalisation and extremism by acting early', <https://actearly.uk>.

Adams, R. (2024) 'Former NUS president settles with union over antisemitism claims', *Guardian*, 7 May, [www.theguardian.com/law/article/2024/may/07/former-nus-president-shaima-dallali-settles-with-union-over-antisemitism-claims](http://www.theguardian.com/law/article/2024/may/07/former-nus-president-shaima-dallali-settles-with-union-over-antisemitism-claims).

Adams, R. and Walker, P. (2024) 'UK science minister apologises and pays damages after academic's libel action', *Guardian*, 5 March, [www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/March/05/uk-science-minister-michelle-donelan-apologises-and-pays-damages-after-academics-libel-action](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2024/March/05/uk-science-minister-michelle-donelan-apologises-and-pays-damages-after-academics-libel-action).

Aitlhadj, L. and Holmwood, J. (2022) *The People's Review of Prevent*, <https://peoplesreviewofprevent.org/prop-report>.

Aked, H. (2020) *False Positives: The Prevent Counter-Extremism Policy in Healthcare*, London: Medact, [www.medact.org/2020/resources/reports/false-positives-the-prevent-counter-extremism-policy-in-healthcare](http://www.medact.org/2020/resources/reports/false-positives-the-prevent-counter-extremism-policy-in-healthcare).

Al Mayadeen (2023) 'UK police arrest British Dr Ranjeet Brar for criticizing Zionism', 26 November, <https://english.almayadeen.net/news/politics/uk-police-arrest-british-dr-ranjeet-brar-for-criticizing-zi>.

Al-Nahari, A.S. (2024) 'Gaza: The world's most documented, unchecked genocide', *Arab News*, 21 May, [www.arabnews.com/node/2513826/gaza-worlds-most-documented-unchecked-genocide](http://www.arabnews.com/node/2513826/gaza-worlds-most-documented-unchecked-genocide).

Amnesty International (2020) 'A licence to discriminate: Trump's Muslim and refugee ban', 6 October, [www.amnesty.org.uk/licence-discriminate-trumps-muslim-refugee-ban](http://www.amnesty.org.uk/licence-discriminate-trumps-muslim-refugee-ban).

Amnesty International (2023) 'This Is the Thought Police': The Prevent Duty and Its Chilling Effect on Human Rights, London, [www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-11/Amnesty%20UK%20Prevent%20report%20%281%29.pdf?VersionId=.hjlwRZuHiGd1\\_IEXcroFwg25jyBtwur](http://www.amnesty.org.uk/files/2023-11/Amnesty%20UK%20Prevent%20report%20%281%29.pdf?VersionId=.hjlwRZuHiGd1_IEXcroFwg25jyBtwur).

APPG on British Muslims (2018) *Islamophobia Defined: The Inquiry into a Working Definition of Islamophobia*, London, <https://appgbritishmuslims.org/publications>.

Archer, N.N. (2024) 'Counter-terror police use of Palestine protests to hone tactics revealed in airport recording', *OpenDemocracy*, 17 January, [www.opendemocracy.net/en/counter-terror-police-palestine-protests-israel-gaza-airport-recording](http://www.opendemocracy.net/en/counter-terror-police-palestine-protests-israel-gaza-airport-recording).

Awan, I. (2012) "'I am a Muslim not an extremist": How the Prevent strategy has constructed a "suspect" community', *Politics & Policy* 40(6): 1158–1185.

Awan, I. and Zempi, I. (2020) *Non-Muslim Men Who Suffer Islamophobia: A Briefing Paper*, Geneva: OHCHR, [www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Islamophobia-AntiMuslim/Civil%20Society%20or%20Individuals/ProfAwan-4.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Islamophobia-AntiMuslim/Civil%20Society%20or%20Individuals/ProfAwan-4.pdf).

Bains, D. (2024) "'We're in it for the long haul": 4 British students on why they're joining campus protests across the UK', *British Vogue*, 4 June, [www.vogue.co.uk/article/pro-palestine-student-camps-uk-protests](http://www.vogue.co.uk/article/pro-palestine-student-camps-uk-protests).

Baroness Casey Review (2023) *Final Report: An Independent Review into the Standards of Behaviour and Internal Culture of the Metropolitan Police Service*, March, [www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/media/downloads/met/about-us/baroness-casey-review/update-march-2023/baroness-casey-review-march-2023a.pdf](http://www.met.police.uk/SysSiteAssets/media/downloads/met/about-us/baroness-casey-review/update-march-2023/baroness-casey-review-march-2023a.pdf).

BBC Sounds (2024) *The Media Show*, 7 August, [www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/m0021qg5](http://www.bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/m0021qg5).

Bentham, M. (2023) 'Gaza attacks raise risk of terror attacks in London, says MET terrorism chief', *Evening Standard*, 29 November, [www.standard.co.uk/news/london/met-police-terror-warning-radicalisation-war-gaza-b1123439.html](http://www.standard.co.uk/news/london/met-police-terror-warning-radicalisation-war-gaza-b1123439.html).

Berger, E. and Jabr, S. (2020) 'Silencing Palestine: Limitations on free speech within mental health organizations', *International Journal of Applied Psychoanalytic Studies* 17(2): 193–207.

Bignall, T., Jeraj, S., Helsby, E. and Butt, J. (2019) *Racial Disparities in Mental Health: Literature and Evidence Review*, London: Race Equality Foundation.

Blake, S. (2024) 'How universities respond to the riots needs careful consideration', *WonkHE*, 8 August, <https://wonkhe.com/blogs/how-universities-respond-to-the-riots-needs-careful-consideration>.

British Future (2024) 'Landmark for representation as diversity of parliament nears that of electorate', 5 July, [www.britishfuture.org/milestone-for-representation-as-diversity-of-parliament-matches-electorate](http://www.britishfuture.org/milestone-for-representation-as-diversity-of-parliament-matches-electorate).

Brown, R. (2023) 'A student was referred to Prevent for tweeting "from the river to the sea"', *Novara Media*, 4 December, <https://novaramedia.com/2023/12/04/a-student-was-referred-to-prevent-for-tweeting-from-the-river-to-the-sea>.

Burton, O. (2023) *Tip of the Spear: Black Radicalism, Prison Repression, and the Long Attica Revolt*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Busby, E. (2018) 'Nursery downgraded for failing to spot toddlers are at risk of extremism', *Independent*, 10 July, [www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/little-ducklings-nursery-prevent-extremism-preschool-ofsted-inspection-hove-a8474266.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/education-news/little-ducklings-nursery-prevent-extremism-preschool-ofsted-inspection-hove-a8474266.html).

Cawkell, F. (2024) 'Goldsmiths pro-Palestine encampment ends after five weeks as uni accepts protestors' demands', *The UCL Tab*, 15 May, <https://thetab.com/uk/london/2024/05/15/goldsmiths-pro-palestine-encampment-ends-after-five-weeks-as-uni-accepts-protestors-demands-53155>.

Chappell, B. (2019) 'N.C. man pleads guilty to killing 3 Muslim college students: Video is played in court', *NPR*, 12 June, [www.npr.org/2019/06/12/731981858/n-c-man-pleads-guilty-to-murdering-3-muslim-college-students](http://www.npr.org/2019/06/12/731981858/n-c-man-pleads-guilty-to-murdering-3-muslim-college-students).

Choudhury, T. (2017) 'Campaigning on campus: Student Islamic societies and counterterrorism', *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 40(12): 1004–1022.

Clinks (2014) *The Young Review: Improving Outcomes for Young Black and/or Muslim Men in the Criminal Justice System*, Mildenhall, Suffolk, [www.clinks.org/publication/young-review](http://www.clinks.org/publication/young-review).

Commission for Countering Extremism (2024) 'Standards and Compliance Unit launched to oversee Prevent', 28 February, [www.gov.uk/government/news/standards-and-compliance-unit-launched-to-oversee-prevent](http://www.gov.uk/government/news/standards-and-compliance-unit-launched-to-oversee-prevent).

Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) (2024) 'Concluding observations on the combined twenty-fourth to twenty-sixth periodic reports of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland', 23 August, [https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/\\_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FGBR%2FCO%2F24-26&Lang=en](https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CERD%2FC%2FGBR%2FCO%2F24-26&Lang=en).

Davies, C. and Sherwood, H. (2024) 'UK professor suffered discrimination due to anti-Zionist beliefs, tribunal rules', *Guardian*, 5 February, [www.theguardian.com/education/2024/February/05/uk-professor-suffered-discrimination-due-to-anti-zionist-beliefs-tribunal-rules](http://www.theguardian.com/education/2024/February/05/uk-professor-suffered-discrimination-due-to-anti-zionist-beliefs-tribunal-rules).

Department for Education (2021) 'Higher education: Free speech and academic freedom', policy paper, 16 February, [www.gov.uk/government/publications/higher-education-free-speech-and-academic-freedom](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/higher-education-free-speech-and-academic-freedom).

Dobbernack, J., Meer, N. and Modood, T., (2023) 'Muslim political agency in British politics', in de Rooij, L. (ed.) *British Muslims and Their Discourses*, Cham, Switzerland: Springer International.

Dodd, V. (2019) 'Police chiefs in row over definition of Islamophobia', *Guardian*, 15 May, [www.theguardian.com/news/2019/may/15/police-chiefs-in-row-over-definition-of-islamophobia](http://www.theguardian.com/news/2019/may/15/police-chiefs-in-row-over-definition-of-islamophobia).

Dorling, D. (2011) *So You Think You Know About Britain?* London: Constable.

The Economist (2024) 'How shallow was Labour's victory in the British election?', 6 July, [www.economist.com/britain/2024/07/06/how-shallow-was-labours-victory-in-the-british-election#content](http://www.economist.com/britain/2024/07/06/how-shallow-was-labours-victory-in-the-british-election#content).

Ehsan, R. (2024) 'The successful Muslim Vote campaign is a snapshot of the future of British politics', *Telegraph*, 5 July, [www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/07/05/britain-has-entered-a-new-era-of-sectarian-politics](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/07/05/britain-has-entered-a-new-era-of-sectarian-politics).

Elahi, F. and Khan O. (2017) *Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us All*, London: Runnymede Trust, [www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-still-a-challenge-for-us-all](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-still-a-challenge-for-us-all).

Electoral Reform Society (2019) 'Millions missing from the electoral register in event of snap election', 27 September, [www.electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/media-centre/press-releases/millions-missing-from-the-electoral-register-in-event-of-snap-election](http://www.electoral-reform.org.uk/latest-news-and-research/media-centre/press-releases/millions-missing-from-the-electoral-register-in-event-of-snap-election).

Elliot, I.A., Randhawa-Horne, K. and Hambly, O. (2023) *The Extremism Risk Guidance 22+ : An Exploratory Psychometric Analysis*, London: Ministry of Justice, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/641c2b8f32a8e000cfa9288/extremism-risk-guidance-22+.pdf>.

Elshayyal, K. (2020) 'Securitisation, fundamental British values and the neutralisation of dissent within Muslim discourses in the UK', *Maydan*, 26 February, <https://themaydan.com/2020/02/securitisation-fundamental-british-values-and-the-neutralisation-of-dissent-within-muslim-discourses-in-the-uk>.

Elshayyal, K. (2024) 'UK extremism: Naming and shaming of Muslim groups aims to stifle all dissent' *Middle East Eye*, 27 March, [www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/uk-extremism-naming-shaming-muslim-groups-stifle-all-dissent-aims](http://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/uk-extremism-naming-shaming-muslim-groups-stifle-all-dissent-aims).

Elshayyal, K. (2024) 'UK elections 2024: Why British Muslim voters can no longer be ignored', *Middle East Eye*, 10 July, [www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/uk-elections-2024-british-muslim-voters-ignored-no-longer-why](http://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/uk-elections-2024-british-muslim-voters-ignored-no-longer-why).

Feldman, D. (2013) 'Anti-Zionism and antisemitism in Britain', in *Proceedings of the International conference 'Antisemitism in Europe Today: The Phenomena, the Conflicts'*, Jewish Museum Berlin, 8–9 November.

Feldman, D. (2020) 'The government should not impose a faulty definition of antisemitism on universities', *Guardian*, 2 December, [www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/December/02/the-government-should-not-impose-a-faulty-definition-of-antisemitism-on-universities](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/December/02/the-government-should-not-impose-a-faulty-definition-of-antisemitism-on-universities).

Fernandez, S. and Tufail, W. (2023) 'Palestine, Islamophobia and the policing of solidarity', *Identities* blog, 14 December, [www.identitiesjournal.com/blog-collection/palestine-islamophobia-and-the-policing-of-solidarity](http://www.identitiesjournal.com/blog-collection/palestine-islamophobia-and-the-policing-of-solidarity).

Foster, T. (2024) 'Swansea students victorious over divestment demands', *Socialist Worker*, 7 June, <https://socialistworker.co.uk/palestine-2023/swansea-students-victorious-over-divestment-demands>.

Foulkes, I. (2024) 'Gaza war: UN rights expert accuses Israel of acts of genocide', *BBC News*, 26 March, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68667556](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-68667556).

Francis, S. (2024) 'Labour lost Muslim voters' trust over Gaza, says MP Shabana Mahmood', *BBC News*, 9 February, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-68244592](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-68244592).

Gholami, R. (2021) 'Critical race theory and Islamophobia: Challenging inequity in higher education', *Race Ethnicity and Education* 24(3): 319–337.

Gould, R. (2020) 'The IHRA definition of antisemitism: Defining antisemitism by erasing Palestinians', *The Political Quarterly* 91(4): 825–832.

Gregory, A. (2024) 'Britain's "strictest headteacher" statement in full as Muslim pupil loses bid to take part in prayer rituals', *Independent*, 17 April, [www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/headteacher-katharine-birbalsingh-muslim-pupil-prayer-b2530040.html](http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/headteacher-katharine-birbalsingh-muslim-pupil-prayer-b2530040.html).

Hall, S., Critcher, C., Jefferson, T., Clarke, J. and Roberts, B. (1978) *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, The State, and the Law*, London: The MacMillian Press.  
Harris, T. (2024) 'The time is right to clamp down on anti-democratic protests', *Telegraph*, 22 May, [www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/05/22/time-right-to-clamp-down-on-protests](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2024/05/22/time-right-to-clamp-down-on-protests).

Hartman, S. (2022) *Scenes of Subjection: Terror, Slavery, and Self-Making in Nineteenth-Century America*, New York: W.W. Norton & Company.  
Hassan, A. (2021) 'Government policy is feeding campus Islamophobia', *Tribune Magazine*, 25 November, <https://tribunemag.co.uk/2021/11/islamophobia-awareness-month-students-prevent-securitisation-state-surveillance>.

Healing Justice LDN (2024) 'Rehearsing Freedoms Festival', <https://healingjusticeldn.org/2024/01/23/rehearsing-freedoms-festival>.

Heaney, S. (1989) *The Government of the Tongue*, New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Heath, A. and Mustafa, A. (2017) 'Poverty and the labour market', in Elahi, F. and Khan, O. (eds) *Islamophobia: Still a Challenge for Us All*, London: Runnymede Trust, [www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-still-a-challenge-for-us-all](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-still-a-challenge-for-us-all).

Heath-Kelly, C. (2024) *Unhealthy Liaisons: NHS Collaboration with the Counter Terrorism Clinical Consultancy Service*, London: Medact, <https://stat.medact.org/wp-uploads/2024/07/Unhealthy-Liaisons-WEB-final-2.pdf>.

Hilton, E. (2024) 'Diaspora Alliance is taking the government to court', *Crowd Justice*, [www.crowdjustice.com/case/fightantisemitism](http://www.crowdjustice.com/case/fightantisemitism).

HM Government (2015) *Prevent Duty Guidance*, London, [www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/9780111133309/pdfs/ukdsiod\\_9780111133309\\_en.pdf](http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdsi/2015/9780111133309/pdfs/ukdsiod_9780111133309_en.pdf).

HM Government (2015) 'Revised Prevent duty guidance: For England and Wales (2015)', [www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance-england-scotland-and-wales-2015/revised-prevent-duty-guidance-for-england-and-wales-2015](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/prevent-duty-guidance-england-scotland-and-wales-2015/revised-prevent-duty-guidance-for-england-and-wales-2015).

HM Government (2021) *The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill: Independent Review of Prevent Fact-sheet*, London, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6022711fe90e0711c8c3d4c5/cts-bil-fact-sheet-independent-review-prevent-jan-2021.pdf>.

HM Government (2023) 'Independent review of Prevent', 20 February, [www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-prevents-report-and-government-response/independent-review-of-prevent-accessible](http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-prevents-report-and-government-response/independent-review-of-prevent-accessible).

Holmwood, J. (2017) *Countering Extremism in British Schools? The truth about the Birmingham Trojan Horse Affair*, Bristol: Policy Press.

Holmwood, J. (ed.) (2022) 'Special issue: The Trojan Horse affair', *Discover Society* 2(2), <https://discoversociety.org/2-2-the-trojan-horse-affair>.  
Home Office (2017) 'Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, 2015 to 2016', *Statistical Bulletin* 23/17, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5a81ea1540f0b62302699d88/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2015-mar2016.pdf>.

Home Office (2018) 'Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, 2016 to 2017', *Statistical Bulletin* 06/18, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5ab5250ced915d78b9a45bod/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2016-mar2017.pdf>.

Home Office (2019) 'Individuals referred to and supported through the Prevent programme, 2017 to 2018', *Statistical Bulletin* 31/18, <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5c0e9aa540f0b60bb17f6ddc/individuals-referred-supported-prevent-programme-apr2017-mar2018-hosb3118.pdf>.

Home Office (2023) 'Individuals referred to and supported by the Prevent programme, April 2021 to March 2022', 26 January, [www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2021-to-march-2022/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2021-to-march-2022](http://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2021-to-march-2022/individuals-referred-to-and-supported-through-the-prevent-programme-april-2021-to-march-2022).

Hopkins, P. (2011) 'Towards critical geographies of the university campus: Understanding the contested experiences of Muslim students', *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 36(1): 157–169.

Human Rights Council (2024) 'Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967', 24 March, [www.un.org/unispal/document/anatomy-of-a-genocide-report-of-the-special-rapporteur-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-palestinian-territory-occupied-since-1967-to-human-rights-council-advance-unedited-version-a-hrc-55](http://www.un.org/unispal/document/anatomy-of-a-genocide-report-of-the-special-rapporteur-on-the-situation-of-human-rights-in-the-palestinian-territory-occupied-since-1967-to-human-rights-council-advance-unedited-version-a-hrc-55).

The Identities Podcast (2024) 'Episode 2: Race, Ethnicity and the UK General Election 2024', <https://soundcloud.com/theidentitiespodcast/episode-2-race-ethnicity-and-the-uk-general-election-2024?>  
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (2022) *Terrorism in Prisons*, London: HMSO, <https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Terrorism-in-Prisons.pdf>.

IRU (2024) 'Press statement: Islamophobia response', press release, 16 February, [www.theiru.org.uk/data-shows-increase-in-islamophobia](http://www.theiru.org.uk/data-shows-increase-in-islamophobia).

Islam, M. (2019) 'Muslim students need exam adjustments during Ramadan', *WonkHE*, 21 November, <https://wonkhe.com/blogs/muslim-students-need-exam-adjustments-during-ramadan>.

Islam, M. (2021) *Building Belonging: Developing Religiously Inclusive Cultures for Muslim Students in Higher Education*, York and London: Advance HE, [www.advance-he.ac.uk/knowledge-hub/building-belonging-developing-religiously-inclusive-cultures-muslim-students-higher](http://www.advance-he.ac.uk/knowledge-hub/building-belonging-developing-religiously-inclusive-cultures-muslim-students-higher).

Islam, M. and Mercer-Mapstone, L. (2021) "'University is a non-Muslim experience, you know? The experience is as good as it can be": Satisfied settling in Muslim students' experiences and implications for Muslim student voice', *British Educational Research Journal* 47(5): 1388–1415.

Islam, M., Lowe T. and Jones, G. (2019) 'A "satisfied settling"? Investigating a sense of belonging for Muslim students in a UK small-medium higher education institution', *Student Engagement in Higher Education Journal* 2(2): 79–104.

Jamal, H. (2023) 'Germany's weaponisation of antisemitism to target migrants and Arabs is what must be condemned', *The New Arab*, 1 December, [www.newarab.com/opinion/palestinian-germany-i-refuse-condemn](http://www.newarab.com/opinion/palestinian-germany-i-refuse-condemn).

Jennings, W. and Glaister, I. (2021) 'The "ethnic data gap" on voters – and why it matters to parties and pollsters', Sky News, 6 August, <https://news.sky.com/story/the-ethnic-data-gap-on-voters-and-why-it-matters-to-parties-and-pollsters-12365500>.

Jenson, Y. and Meer, N. (eds) (2020) 'Genealogies of "Jews" and "Muslims": Social imaginaries in the race-religion nexus', *Patterns of Prejudice* 54(1–2): 1–214. Kavanagh, T. (2017) 'Now Philip Hammond is finally Out he must shut the door behind him and take control over our laws, our trade and especially immigration', Sun, 21 August, [www.thesun.co.uk/news/4235655/nw-philip-hammond-is-finally-out-he-must-shut-the-door-behind-him-and-take-control-over-our-laws-our-trade-and-especially-immigration](http://www.thesun.co.uk/news/4235655/nw-philip-hammond-is-finally-out-he-must-shut-the-door-behind-him-and-take-control-over-our-laws-our-trade-and-especially-immigration).

Khalili, L. (2013) *Time in the Shadows: Confinement in Counterinsurgencies*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Khan, D. (2022) 'The representation of Muslims in higher education', 11 October, <https://bookdown.org/content/30c7aefc-cd68-4fc6-9650-dba903e26eec>.

Khan, S. (2024) 'Tory leadership race is hugely important for British Muslims – in more ways than one', Hyphen, 4 September, <https://hyphenonline.com/2024/09/04/tory-leadership-race-is-important-for-british-muslims-in-more-ways-than-one-robert-jenrick-kemi-badenoch>.

Khatib, R., McKee, M. and Yusuf, S. (2024) 'Counting the dead in Gaza: Difficult but essential', *Lancet*, correspondence, 5 July, [www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2824%2901169-3](http://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2824%2901169-3)

Lloyd, M. and Dean, C. (2015) 'The Development of the ERG 22+ Structured Professional Guidelines for Assessing Risk of Extremist Offending', *Journal of Threat Assessment and Management* 2(1): 40–52.

Loft, P., Jozepa, I. and Mirza-Davies, J. (2024) 'Economic Activity of Public Bodies (Overseas Matters) Bill 2022–23', House of Commons Library, 9 January, <https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/research-briefings/cbp-9822>.

Malik, A. and Wykes, E. (2018) *British Muslims in UK Higher Education: Socio-Political, Religious and Policy Considerations*, London: Bridge Institute, [www.azizfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/British-Muslims-in-UK-HE.pdf](http://www.azizfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/British-Muslims-in-UK-HE.pdf).

Marr, A. (2023) 'Labour "hemorrhaging" support over Israel Hamas war', *New Statesman*, 1 November, [www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikdfqRRgRGo](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ikdfqRRgRGo).

McQuade, J. (2020) *A Genealogy of Terrorism: Colonial Law and the Origins of an Idea*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Meer, N. (2006) "'Get off your knees": Print media public intellectuals and Muslims in Britain', *Journalism Studies* 7(1): 35–59.

Meer, N. and Modood, T. (2009) 'Refutations of racism in the "Muslim question"', *Patterns of Prejudice* 43(3–4): 335–354

Meer, N., Dwyer, C. and Modood, T. (2010) 'Beyond "Angry Muslims"? Reporting Muslim voices in the British press', *Journal of Media and Religion* 9(4): 216–231.

Metropolitan Police (no date) 'Prevent', [www.met.police.uk/advice-and-information/t/prevent/prevent/#:~:text=You're%20best%20placed%20to,from%20being%20groomed%20and%20radicalised](http://www.met.police.uk/advice-and-information/t/prevent/prevent/#:~:text=You're%20best%20placed%20to,from%20being%20groomed%20and%20radicalised).

Mirza, M. (2024) 'War on Gaza: Why are UK universities inviting police to curb student protests?' *Middle East Eye*, 29 June, [www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/gaza-war-uk-universities-police-crack-down-protesters-why](http://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/gaza-war-uk-universities-police-crack-down-protesters-why).

Modood, T. (2023) 'Islamophobia, antisemitism and the struggle for recognition: The politics of definitions', in Feldman, D. and Volocici, M. (eds) *Antisemitism, Islamophobia and the Politics of Definition*, Cham, Switzerland: Springer International.

Mohammed, R. (2020) *Time to End the Silence: The Experience of Muslims in the Prison System*, London: Maslaha, [www.maslaha.org/Project/time-to-end-the-silence](http://www.maslaha.org/Project/time-to-end-the-silence).

Monetta, S. (2024) 'Anti-Muslim cases surge in UK since Hamas attacks, charity finds', *BBC News*, 22 February, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-68374372](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-68374372).

Muslim Census (2021) 'Levelling up unequal access to university education', 11 October, <https://muslimcensus.co.uk/unequal-access-to-university-education>.

Muslim Census Team (2022) 'Muslims and the cost of living crisis', 10 November, <https://muslimcensus.co.uk/cost-of-living-crisis>.

Muslim Council of Britain (2022) '2021 Census: As UK population grows, so do British Muslim communities', 29 November, <https://mcb.org.uk/2021-census-as-uk-population-grows-so-do-british-muslim-communities>.

National Secular Society (2023) 'Islamophobia definitions threaten free speech at 20+ universities', 23 November, [www.secularism.org.uk/news/2023/11/islamophobia-definitions-threaten-free-speech-at-20-universities](http://www.secularism.org.uk/news/2023/11/islamophobia-definitions-threaten-free-speech-at-20-universities).

National Union of Students (NUS) (2018) *The Experience of Muslim Students in 2017–18*, Stockport, [www.nusconnect.org.uk/resources/the-experience-of-muslim-students-in-2017-18](http://www.nusconnect.org.uk/resources/the-experience-of-muslim-students-in-2017-18).

Nazroo, J., Bhui, K. and Rhodes, J. (2020) 'Where next for understanding race/ethnic inequalities in severe mental illness? Structural, interpersonal and institutional racism', *Sociology of Health & Illness* 42(2): 262–276.

Olusoga, D. (2024) 'There can be no excuses', *Guardian*, 10 August, [www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/August/10/there-can-be-no-excuses-the-uk-riots-were-violent-racism-fomented-by-populism](http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/August/10/there-can-be-no-excuses-the-uk-riots-were-violent-racism-fomented-by-populism).

ONS (Office for National Statistics) (2023) 'Religion by age and sex, England and Wales: Census 2021', 30 January, [www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/religionbyageandsexenglandandwales/census2021](http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/religionbyageandsexenglandandwales/census2021).

ONS (2023) 'Religion by housing, health, employment, and education, England and Wales: Census 2021', 24 March, [www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/](http://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/culturalidentity/religion/articles/)

Operation Black Vote and Runnymede Trust (2024) 'Prime minister: Scrap unfair voter ID laws', letter to Prime Minister, 25 July, <https://drive.google.com/file/d/1YmtORlloFjxBfIrV6ej2OoRXYjgHfXNP/view>.

Palestine Solidarity Network (2024) 'Petition by Palestine Solidarity Network: University of Southampton', <https://docs.google.com/document/d/1fIU36swkoT-9btOgAXNozn72eI6LuG9meBM-WLljjw/edit>.

Pollard, S. (2024) 'This election makes Britain ever more vulnerable to sanitised Islamism', *Jewish Chronicle*, 5 July, [www.thejc.com/lets-talk/forget-gaza-the-real-impact-of-last-nights-pro-palestine-winners-will-be-on-labour-mps-sy7ank7x](http://www.thejc.com/lets-talk/forget-gaza-the-real-impact-of-last-nights-pro-palestine-winners-will-be-on-labour-mps-sy7ank7x).

Poynting, S. and Whyte, D. (eds) (2012) *Counter-Terrorism and State Political Violence: The 'War on Terror' as Terror*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

Press Association (2017) 'Grenfell Tower mental health response "largest of its kind in Europe"', *Guardian*, 30 October, [www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/October/30/grenfell-tower-mental-health-response-largest-of-its-kind-in-europe](http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2017/October/30/grenfell-tower-mental-health-response-largest-of-its-kind-in-europe).

Prison Reform Trust (2024) *Bromley Briefings Prison Factfile: February 2024*, London, <https://prisonreformtrust.org.uk/publication/bromley-briefings-prison-factfile-february-2024>.

Rahman Lowe Solicitors (2024) 'Rahman Lowe secure significant compensation from Baroness who falsely accused University Challenge student of antisemitism over blue octopus mascot', [www.rllaw.co.uk/rahman-lowes-secure-significant-compensation-from-baroness-who-falsely-accused-university-challenge-student-of-antisemitism](http://www.rllaw.co.uk/rahman-lowes-secure-significant-compensation-from-baroness-who-falsely-accused-university-challenge-student-of-antisemitism).

Ramadan, I. (2022) 'When faith intersects with gender: The challenges and successes in the experiences of Muslim women academics', *Gender and Education* 34(1): 33–48.

Redcar and Cleveland Council (no date) 'What is Prevent', [www.redcar-cleveland.gov.uk/community-safety/prevent/what-is-prevent](http://www.redcar-cleveland.gov.uk/community-safety/prevent/what-is-prevent).

Rights and Security International (no date) *Rights and Security International's Submissions for the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief's Report on Anti-Muslim Hatred and Discrimination*, OHCHR, [www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Islamophobia-AntiMuslim/Civil%20Society%20or%20Individuals/RightsandSecurityInternational.pdf](http://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Religion/Islamophobia-AntiMuslim/Civil%20Society%20or%20Individuals/RightsandSecurityInternational.pdf).

Robinson, M. (2024) 'The pro-Palestine independents who turned the Gaza war on Keir', *Daily Mail*, 5 July, [www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13603457/The-pro-Palestine-independents-turned-Gaza-war-Keir-TikTok-barrister-Leicester-optician-Batley-consultant-Blackburn-lawyer-seized-Labour-seats-thanks-Muslim-vote.html](http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-13603457/The-pro-Palestine-independents-turned-Gaza-war-Keir-TikTok-barrister-Leicester-optician-Batley-consultant-Blackburn-lawyer-seized-Labour-seats-thanks-Muslim-vote.html).

Rodney, R. (2019) *The Groundings with my Brothers*, London: Verso.

Runnymede Trust (1997) *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, London, [www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-a-challenge-for-us-all](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/islamophobia-a-challenge-for-us-all).

Runnymede Trust (2023) *Over-Policed and Under-Protected: The Road to Safer Schools*, London, [www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/over-policed-and-under-protected-the-road-to-safer-schools](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/over-policed-and-under-protected-the-road-to-safer-schools).

Runnymede Trust (2024) 'UK racist riots: Open letter to Keir Starmer from 80 anti-racist and migrants' rights organisations', 5 August, [www.runnymedetrust.org/news/uk-racist-riots-open-letter-to-keir-starmer-from-80-anti-racist-and-migrants-rights-organisations](http://www.runnymedetrust.org/news/uk-racist-riots-open-letter-to-keir-starmer-from-80-anti-racist-and-migrants-rights-organisations).

Salisbury, J. (2023) 'Teacher wanted by police after carrying placard showing Sunak and Braverman as coconuts at pro-Palestine march', Standard, 14 November, [www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/met-police-coconuts-poster-rishi-sunak-suella-braverman-pro-palestine-march-b1120176.html](http://www.standard.co.uk/news/crime/met-police-coconuts-poster-rishi-sunak-suella-braverman-pro-palestine-march-b1120176.html).

Samari, G., Alcalá, H.E. and Sharif, M.Z. (2018) 'Islamophobia, health, and public health: A systematic literature review', *American Journal of Public Health* 108(6): e1–e9.

Samatar, A. and Sardar, Z. (2023) *Transitions: British Muslims between Undergraduate and PGT Studies*, London: Aziz Foundation, [www.azizfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/British-Muslims-UPGT-FINAL-2.pdf](http://www.azizfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/British-Muslims-UPGT-FINAL-2.pdf).

Samira, A. (2023) 'Protecting children as a teacher means speaking up about Israel's crimes in Gaza', *The New Arab*, 23 October, [www.newarab.com/opinion/silence-violence-uk-schools-implicit-gaza-genocide](http://www.newarab.com/opinion/silence-violence-uk-schools-implicit-gaza-genocide).

Savanta (2024) 'Cultural issues poll: Hyphen', 11 June, <https://savanta.com/knowledge-centre/press-and-polls/cultural-issues-poll-hyphen-11-june-2024>.

Shaffait, H. (2019) *Inclusivity at University: Muslim Student Experiences*, London: Kings College London, [www.kcl.ac.uk/geography/assets/kcl-sspp-muslim-policy-report-digital-aw.pdf](http://www.kcl.ac.uk/geography/assets/kcl-sspp-muslim-policy-report-digital-aw.pdf).

Shaheen, M. (2024) 'Islamophobia in higher education environments', *New Directions for Higher Education* 206: 41–52.

Shapiro, J. (2017) 'How one inmate changed the prison system from the inside' NPR, 14 April, [www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/04/14/507297469/how-one-inmate-changed-the-prison-system-from-the-inside](http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2017/04/14/507297469/how-one-inmate-changed-the-prison-system-from-the-inside).

Sharkey, K. and Fox, M. (2024) 'Trinity College Dublin protest camp to end after agreement made', BBC News, 8 May, [www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cv2jlp9yl7zo](http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cv2jlp9yl7zo).

Sian, K. (2017) 'Surveillance, Islamophobia, and Sikh bodies in the War on Terror', *Islamophobia Studies Journal* 4(1): 37–52.

Siddique, H. (2024) 'What is the genocide convention and how might it apply to the UK and Israel?' *Guardian*, 3 April, [www.theguardian.com/law/2024/apr/03/what-is-the-genocide-convention-and-how-might-it-apply-to-the-uk-and-israel](http://www.theguardian.com/law/2024/apr/03/what-is-the-genocide-convention-and-how-might-it-apply-to-the-uk-and-israel).

Simons, J.W. (2024) 'Why the Muslim Vote campaign is a glimpse into a horrifying future', *Telegraph*, 7 July, [www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2024/07/07/the-muslim-vote-sectarian-insurgency-gaza-shocked-britain](http://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2024/07/07/the-muslim-vote-sectarian-insurgency-gaza-shocked-britain).

Sky News (2024) 'Jenrick suggests those who shout "Allahu Akbar" on the streets should face arrest', 7 August, [www.youtube.com/watch?v=SoOCRY4vTGc](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SoOCRY4vTGc).

Sky News (2024) 'Michael Gove says "good-hearted people" at pro-Palestine marches should question potential "extremist organisers"', 10 March, <https://news.sky.com/story/michael-gove-says-good-hearted-people-attending-pro-palestine-marches-should-question-potential-extremist-organisers-13091567>.

Stein, J. and Townsend, M. (2021) 'Muslim boy, 4, was referred to Prevent over game of Fortnite', *Guardian*, 31 January, [www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/January/31/muslim-boy-4-was-referred-to-prevent-over-game-of-fortnite#:~:text=The%20boy%2C%20who%20is%20from,weaponry%20was%20linked%20to%20Fortnite](http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/January/31/muslim-boy-4-was-referred-to-prevent-over-game-of-fortnite#:~:text=The%20boy%2C%20who%20is%20from,weaponry%20was%20linked%20to%20Fortnite).

Stevenson, J. (2018) *Muslim Students in UK Higher Education: Issues of Inequality and Inequity*, London: Bridge Institute.

Stevenson, J., Demack, S., Stiell, B., Abdi, M., Clarkson, L., Ghaffar, F. and Hassan, S. (2017) *The Social Mobility Challenges faced by Young Muslims*, London: Social Mobility Commission, [https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment\\_data/file/642220/Young\\_Muslims\\_SMC.pdf](https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/642220/Young_Muslims_SMC.pdf).

Stop the War Coalition (2023) 'Joint statement on the policing of the Palestine demonstrations', 29 November, [www.stopwar.org.uk/article/joint-statement-on-the-policing-of-the-palestine-demonstrations](http://www.stopwar.org.uk/article/joint-statement-on-the-policing-of-the-palestine-demonstrations).

Student Federation for a Liberated Palestine (2024) 'Manifesto', Instagram, 16 August, [www.instagram.com/p/C-vQ5PJolye/?img\\_index=1](http://www.instagram.com/p/C-vQ5PJolye/?img_index=1).

Syal, R. Sabbagh, D. and Stacey, K. (2023) 'Suella

Braverman calls pro-Palestine demos "hate marches"', *Guardian*, 30 October, [www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/October/30/uk-ministers-cobra-meeting-terrorism-threat-israel-hamas-conflict-suella-braverman](http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2023/October/30/uk-ministers-cobra-meeting-terrorism-threat-israel-hamas-conflict-suella-braverman).

Telegraph (2024) 'Protesters chant "Allahu Akbar" in Rochdale after police officer "stamps on man's head"', 25 July, <https://youtu.be/4vTbg6jUKB8?si=4-UMqXCXZEKV5l3v>.

Tufail, W. and Poynting, S. (2023) 'Policing Muslims: Counter terrorism policing in the UK and Australia', in Cunneen, C., Deckert, A., Porter, A., Tauri, J and Webb, R. (eds) *The Routledge International Handbook on Decolonizing Justice*, Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge.

UK Government (2023) 'Message on the Israel Hamas conflict from the Education Secretary Gillian Keegan, the Minister for Schools Nick Gibb and the Minister for Skills, Apprenticeships and Higher Education Robert Halfon', 17 October, <https://content.govdelivery.com/accounts/UKDFE/bulletins/3763f13>.

UK Parliament (2024) 'Election history of Rochdale', <https://members.parliament.uk/constituency/3700/election-history>.

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) (2023) 'Israel working to expel civilian population of Gaza, UN expert warns', 22 December, [www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/12/israel-working-expel-civilian-population-gaza-un-expert-warns](http://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2023/12/israel-working-expel-civilian-population-gaza-un-expert-warns).

Union of Jewish Students (2024) 'Combatting antisemitism: IHRA campaign', [www.ujs.org.uk/ihra\\_campaign](http://www.ujs.org.uk/ihra_campaign).

Universities UK (2021) 'Tackling Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hatred: Practical guidance for UK universities', [www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/what-we-do/policy-and-research/publications/tackling-islamophobia-and-anti-muslim](http://www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/what-we-do/policy-and-research/publications/tackling-islamophobia-and-anti-muslim).

Walawalkar, A., Clugston, H. and Milton, J. (2024) 'Universities accused of "spying" on student protestors for police', *Metro*, 2 July, <https://metro.co.uk/2024/07/02/universities-accused-spying-student-gaza-protesters-police-21142804>.

Watson Institute (no date) 'Costs of war', <https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/figures>.

Who Can I Vote For? (no date) 'Iqbal Mohamed', <https://whocanivotefor.co.uk/person/117203/iqbal-hussain-mohamed>.

Wilson Gilmore, R. (2007) *Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalising California*, Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Wilson Gilmore, R. (2022) *Abolition Geography: Essays Towards Liberation*, London: Verso.

Winter, A. (2024) *Briefing: Islamophobia and Antisemitism*, London: Community Policy Forum, <https://communitypolicyforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/04/Islamophobia-and-Antisemitism.pdf>.

Yaqoob, Z., Qureshi, H., Malik, A. and Latif, A. (2019) 'Career choices for Muslim women in the NHS: Hindered by dress code?' *Journal of the British Islamic Medical Association* 2(1).

Younis, T. (2023) *The Muslim, State and Mind*, London: Sage.

Younis, T. and Jadhav, S. (2019) 'Keeping our mouths shut: The fear and racialized self-censorship of British healthcare professionals in Prevent training', *Culture, Medicine, and Psychiatry* 43(3): 404–424.

Yusuf, H. (2023) 'Why do UK media insist Palestinians condemn Hamas but not that Israelis condemn Israel?' *Declassified UK*, 4 November, [www.declassifieduk.org/why-do-uk-media-insist-palestinians-condemn-hamas-but-not-that-israelis-condemn-israel](http://www.declassifieduk.org/why-do-uk-media-insist-palestinians-condemn-hamas-but-not-that-israelis-condemn-israel).

Zargar, H. (2024) 'India: Why Muslim lynchings continue unabated in Modi's third term', *Middle East Yete*, 12 August, [www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/india-modi-third-time-muslim-lynchings-continue-unabated-why](http://www.middleeasteye.net/opinion/india-modi-third-time-muslim-lynchings-continue-unabated-why).

Zirin, D. (2023) 'The march for Israel was a hate rally', 15 November, [www.thenation.com/article/activism/march-israel-hate-rally-democrats](http://www.thenation.com/article/activism/march-israel-hate-rally-democrats).  
Foundation, [www.azizfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/British-Muslims-UPGT-FINAL-2.pdf](http://www.azizfoundation.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/British-Muslims-UPGT-FINAL-2.pdf).

